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AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION
Mary Becker*
ABSTRACT
In this Article, Professor Becker argues that heterosexual rela-
tionships are more problematic for women than lesbian rela-
tionships, particularly when such relationships are viewed in
terms of their tendency to objectify the "other." She discusses
how current "moral" norms concerning the inferiority of ho-
mosexuality to heterosexuality enable men to use women in
immoral and subordinating ways. She explores moral taboos
against lesbian relationships and asserts that these taboos fa-
cilitate heterosexual male exploitation of women's sexuality by
obscuring from some women the possibility that they might
prefer more equitable relationships with women rather than
with men. She argues for greater acceptance of lesbian rela-
tionships because it will allow women to choose between het-
erosexual and same-sex relationships and will force men to
commit to moral heterosexual relationships. She concludes by
examining bans on lesbian marriages. She asserts that these
bans not only discriminate between men and women on a for-
mal level but also discriminate substantively by facilitating the
ability of men to exploit women's sexuality as well as their
emotional, domestic, and reproductive labor.
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I. INTRODUCTION
People use moral and religious arguments for the worst of
causes and the best of causes. Moral and religious arguments
have supported and opposed violence, slavery, and patriarchy. A
moral norm can spring from venerated traditions yet justify
injustice.
The Supreme Court sometimes upholds statutes justified by
traditional moral and religious norms and at other times strikes
down such statutes as unconstitutional. In the nineteenth cen-
tury, the Court accepted discrimination against women in bar ad-
missions as justified by the "the law of the Creator,"' but since
1971, the Court has regarded laws that overtly classify on the ba-
sis of sex as unconstitutional unless the classification substantially
furthers a legitimate and important governmental objective. 2
The Court has not limited rejection of moral justifications to
cases involving discrimination against women. In Loving v. Vir-
ginia,3 the state of Virginia argued that its antimiscegenation
statute was grounded in traditional moral and religious norms.
The Court nevertheless held that the statute discriminated on the
basis of race and struck it as unconstitutional. 4 Likewise, state
regulations of contraceptives and abortion for married and un-
married couples were justified by traditional moral norms yet
were held unconstitutional by the Court in Griswald v. Connecti-
cut,5 Eisenstadt v. Baird,6 Roe v. Wade,7 and subsequent privacy
cases.
8
I Today, moral and religious arguments are used to justify dis-
crimination against lesbians and gay men. In the two Supreme
Court cases dealing with lesbian and gay discrimination, such ar-
guments have succeeded once and failed once. In Bowers v.
Hardwick,9 the Supreme Court held that a Georgia statute
1. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) (stating
that the "law of the Creator" demanded that a married woman accept her "para-
mount destiny and mission ... to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and
mother.").
2. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
3. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
4. Id. at 12.
5. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
6. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973), modified, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
8. E.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Webster v. Reprod.
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
9. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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criminalizing all anal and oral sex, whether heterosexual or ho-
mosexual could constitutionally be applied to homosexual sod-
omy because "[p]roscriptions against that conduct have ancient
roots."10 Justice White, writing for the Court, explained that "the
law... is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws
representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated
under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy in-
deed."'" Justice Berger, concurring, cited Blackstone for the
proposition that sodomy is "'an offense of deeper malignity' than
rape."' 2
In Romer v. Evans,13 the Court held that the Colorado Con-
stitution could not bar any governmental statute, regulation, or-
dinance, or policy protecting lesbians, gay men, or bisexuals from
discrimination. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, held that
the challenged amendment to the Colorado Constitution - ban-
ning any governmental protection of lesbians and gay men - did
not pass rational basis scrutiny because "the amendment seems
inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class that it af-
fects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state inter-
ests."' 4 Kennedy simply ignored Bowers v. Hardwick and
justifications for the amendment based on the ancient moral
norms given great deference in that case.' 5
Many legal classifications, such as laws banning murder,
theft, assault, rape, adultery, sexual abuse of children, and necro-
philia, are based on traditional moral norms. That a classification
has traditional moral roots does not necessarily mean that it is
invalid. But neither can such roots establish that the law is non-
discriminatory and serves morality, despite Justice Scalia's belief
in a constitution adopted to protect all moral norms from demo-
cratic encroachments. 16
10. Id. at 192.
11. Id. at 196.
12. Id. at 197 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 215).
13. 116 S.Ct. 1620 (1996).
14. Id. at 1627.
15. See Jane S. Schacter, Romer v. Evans and Democracy's Domain, 50 VAND.
L. REV. 361, 381 (1997). ("The [Romer] opinion also raises, but does not answer
clearly, the critical question whether intolerance of homosexuality framed in terms
of traditional values is the same thing as anti-gay animus.").
16. See Romer, 116 S.Ct. at 1629, 1634-35 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (insisting that
constitutional provisions can disfavor a group for moral reasons and citing in sup-
port, Colorado's Amendment 2 and Arizona, Idaho, New Mexico, Oklahoma and
Utah's state constitutional provisions which forever prohibit polygamy); see also
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Moral justifications for discrimination against lesbians and
gay men might seem to stand on a different footing from those
used to support discrimination against racial minorities and wo-
men because lesbians and gay men can be defined by conduct
traditionally considered immoral, i.e., sodomy,17 whereas neither
women nor racial minorities are defined in terms of conduct.
However, antimiscegenation statutes banned conduct tradition-
ally seen as immoral - interracial marriage in southern states -
yet in Loving v. Virginia, the Court nevertheless held such a stat-
ute unconstitutional.
Moreover, the subordinate status of African-Americans and
women was justified by their "immoral" natures, natures seen as
especially weak with respect to sexual mores. In the end, these
morality-based justifications exacerbated immorality. Because
women and African-Americans had limited rights, white people
and men were free to treat African-Americans and women in vi-
olent and immoral ways, including sexual abuse and rape of wo-
men as slaves or wives.18 Thus, norms regarding the sexual
immorality of certain groups facilitated violent and immoral sex-
ual exploitation and subordination of many by members of the
dominant "moral" group.
Despite the Supreme Court's acceptance of moral justifica-
tions for classifications in some equal protection and due process
cases and rejection in others, the Court has never explained how
it decides whether to accept or reject such justifications. It is
easy to understand this failure; neither lawyers nor judges are
trained to grapple with moral questions. Despite the explosion
of scholarship on lesbian and gay issues in the legal literature
Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029, 1066-67 (1990)
(arguing that we should "respect the past because the world of culture that we in-
herit from it makes us who we are" and because "the very acts by which we satisfy
our obligations to the past put the future in debt to us, and force us to depend upon
the future for the preservation of whatever contributions we in turn make to the
world of culture during our trusteeship .... ).
17. Many commentators have noted that in fact the meaning of sodomy has
varied tremendously over time and it has never included only sexual acts of lesbians
and gay men (instead, many sexual acts between heterosexuals have been within the
scope of such statutes) nor even any core act or acts performed by every "active"
homosexual. Much modern heterosexuality would fall within traditional definitions
of sodomy. See Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity In and
After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721 (1993); Nan D. Hunter, Life After
Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531 (1992).
18. Rape did not include nonconsensual coerced sex with wives or slaves.
1998]
UCLA WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:165
over the last ten years, 19 most of this literature has avoided moral
arguments.20
In this Article, I argue that we should assess the morality of
sexual relationships21 in terms of their tendency to objectify the
"other" in autonomy-denying ways, that is, in ways that the ob-
ject would rather avoid than endure were there no consequences.
Judged by this metric, heterosexual relationships are more prob-
lematic for women than lesbian relationships. The problem is
not simply that people in heterosexual relationships tend to ob-
jectify each other, but that men and women in heterosexual rela-
tionships tend to view women as men's sexual objects rather than
as sexual subjects in their own right.22 Such objectification is
possible because women have less social power overall than men.
Autonomy-denying objectification tends, therefore, to support
and exacerbate women's subordinate status, perpetuating an-
other moral wrong in addition to autonomy-denying objectifica-
tion. In addition, the compulsory nature of heterosexuality in
our culture today tends to hide from women options that might
enable them to find more moral and more equitable intimate re-
lationships with other women.
19. Many have argued that discrimination against lesbians and gay men is sex
discrimination given the complex ways in which sex, gender, and sexual orientation
are intertwined in our social norms and stereotypes. See Andrew Koppleman, Why
Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 197 (1994) [hereinafter Koppelman, Discrimination] (discussing sexism as a
partial explanation for homophobia); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social
Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 187; Andrew Koppleman, Note, The Misce-
genation Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 145 (1988). On
the confusion of sex, gender, and sexual orientation in legal analysis, see Francisco
Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy: Tracing the Conflation of Sex, Gender and
Sexual Orientation to Its Origins, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 161 (1996); Francisco
Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of
"Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83
CAL. L. REV. 1 (1995); Mary Ann C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and
Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105
YALE L.J. 1 (1995); Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination
Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1995)
20. But cf. Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 STAN. L. REV. 45,
81-83 (1996) (arguing that morality is the core issue).
21. As John Stuart Mill pointed out, it is in relationships of greatest intimacy
that the desire to dominate is most powerful "for every one who desires power,
desires it most over those who are nearest to him, with whom his life is passed, with
whom he has most concerns in common, and in whom any independence of his au-
thority is oftenest likely to interfere with his individual preferences." JOHN STUART
MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 19 (1869).
22. See infra Part III.
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Rules banning lesbian relationships facilitate male exploita-
tion and expropriation of women's sexuality as well as emotional,
domestic, and reproductive labor. These rules pressure women
who might prefer more equitable relationships with women into
relationships with men23 and limit the political and social power
of all women, particularly lesbians. Ancient moral norms should
not, therefore, be regarded as a legitimate basis for these rules.
Instead, such laws should be seen as facilitating immorality.
In light of the immoral function morality-based norms can
play, I propose that in constitutional cases, the legitimacy of a
justification based on traditional morality should depend on
whether it contributes significantly to the subordination of one
group to another. I do not just mean that one group is given a
preference denied another, but that the law facilitates personal,
even intimate, relationships of domination between members of
the groups as well as the ability of one group to exploit another
group's labor or sexuality for its own purposes. Because of the
law, individuals in the favored group are able to form individual
relationships with members of the disfavored group, relation-
ships in which they dominate and are able to harness the sexual-
ity or labor of the disfavored group for their own purposes. 24
23. Much of my analysis derives from Adrienne Rich's classic essay on compul-
sory heterosexuality. In that essay, Rich describes the many ways in which men
subordinate and exploit women and the connection between such phenomena and
compulsory heterosexuality. Rich suggests that men's greatest fear - the fear that
is at the base of compulsory heterosexuality - is not that women might be sexually
insatiable but that "women could be indifferent to [men] altogether, that men could
be allowed sexual and emotional - therefore economic - access to women only on
women's terms, otherwise being left on the periphery of the matrix." Adrienne
Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, 5 SIGNS 631, 643 (1980).
However, compulsory heterosexuality came to be part of our culture and law, its
effect is to facilitate men's access to women's sexual, reproductive, emotional, and
domestic labor on men's terms, no matter how unfair or immoral, as well as wo-
men's subordination to individual men in relationships of great intimacy.
24. This is a far narrower approach than that suggested as a possibility by Ron-
ald Dworkin, namely that a moral majority cannot limit the liberty of other citizens
simply because it disapproves of their choices. See Ronald Dworkin, Sex, Death,
and the Courts, N.Y. REV. BooKs, Aug. 8, 1996, at 44.
For discussions of when the Court should not accept moral justifications in con-
stitutional cases, see Koppleman, Discrimination, supra note 19, at 284 (stating that
moral convictions should not be accepted as justifying discrimination when "predi-
cated on a world view which deemed some persons intrinsically less worthy of con-
cern and respect than others on the basis of race or sex or both."); J.M. Balkin, The
Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2320 (1997) ("[A]ssertions about what is
moral and immoral, normal and deviant, honorable and dishonorable are not
smokescreens for illicit motivation, but the very fabric of a system of social domina-
tion." Moral arguments for status hierarchies must be subjected to moral criticisms
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Laws establishing slavery and denying property rights to married
women could not be justified by traditional moral norms under
this standard, because these laws facilitated the ability of whites
and men to dominate slaves and women in personal relationships
and to exploit their labor and sexuality.
On the other hand, laws banning necrophilia and polyg-
amy 25 could be sustained under this standard. These laws prefer
certain people over others but they do not facilitate the ability of
nonnecrophiliacs to dominate necrophiliacs in personal and eco-
nomic relationships. Laws prohibiting or refusing to recognize
lesbian marriages would, however, be struck under this principle.
Such laws violate the sex-equality provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment since they discriminate on the basis of sex on both
formal and substantive levels. Furthermore, they cannot be justi-
fied simply on the basis of "traditional American moral
values." 26
In this Article, my primary concern is the morality of sexual-
ity with a focus on women.27 Similar arguments have been made
in support of lesbian and gay rights, 28 but new arguments emerge
with the focus on women. These arguments are visible if and
only if the focus is on women because these arguments describe
the ways in which the current practice of compulsory heterosexu-
ality contributes to and facilitates the ability of men to
and laws discriminating against lesbians and gay men should be rejected because
they are "connected to the oppression" of one social group (women) by another
(men)). Balkin's conclusion is broader than mine. I argue for the narrower proposi-
tion that moral arguments should be rejected when such arguments facilitate the
immoral exploitation of the subordinate group's sexuality or labor by the dominant
group. See infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
25. There are many arguments that can be made against polygamy from the
perspective of women. See Maura I. Strassberg, Distinctions of Form or Substance:
Monogamy, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1502 (1997). For
discussions of the history of polygamy, see Sarah Barringer Gordon, "The Liberty of
Self-Degradation": Polygamy, Woman Suffrage, and Consent in Nineteenth-Century
America, 83 J. AM. HIST. 815 (1996).
26. Romer v. Evans, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 1629, 1636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the majority should have upheld Colorado's Amendment 2 since it is a
"reasonable effort to preserve traditional American moral values.").
27. Cf. Mary Coombs, Comment, Between Women/Between Men: The Signifi-
cance for Lesbianism of Historical Understandings of Same- (Male) Sex Sexual Activi-
ties, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 241 (1996) (focusing on homosexual men in available
historical material and suggesting possible differences as well as similarities in exper-
iences of lesbians and gay men today); Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence:
Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 191 (1989) (discussing the ten-
dency of feminist theory to focus only on heterosexual women).
28. See supra notes 19-20.
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subordinate women in personal relationships. Given this focus, I
do not address an entirely different question debated within the
lesbian and gay community, namely the pros29 and cons30 of ad-
vocating for marriage rights at this point in time, though I do
consider this question briefly in my conclusion.
In Part II, I briefly discuss the traditional moral and reli-
gious arguments that homosexuality is immoral for either conse-
quentialist reasons (it causes harm to those involved, their
friends, families, and society) or inherent reasons (heterosexual-
ity is inherently, necessarily, morally superior to lesbian sexual-
ity). I begin with these arguments for two reasons. First, before
making my moral argument about lesbian and heterosexual sexu-
ality in sections III and IV, I want to explore traditional argu-
ments against same-sex relationships and demonstrate how weak
such arguments are when applied to lesbian relationships. Sec-
ond, modern moral arguments about the inherent superiority of
heterosexual intercourse within marriage do include, I believe,
an important insight - immoral sex can alienate the conscious
self from the physical self in harmful ways.
In Parts III and IV, I argue that traditional bans on lesbian
relationships facilitate the ability of heterosexual men to exploit
women's sexuality and their domestic and reproductive labor. In
Part III, I begin with what initially seems a wholly different mea-
sure for assessing the morality of sexuality from those discussed
in Part II, namely whether the subject objectifies the other in
autonomy-denying ways. I analyze objectification and identify its
more harmful forms. I then look across sexual orientation cate-
gories to determine which sexual orientation is most immoral to
women based on its tendency to objectify women in harmful
29. For intracommunity arguments for seeking the right to marry, see WILLIAM
N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY
TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT, 51-85 (1996); Thomas Stoddard, Why Gay People
Should Seek the Right to Marry, OUT/LOOK, NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN Q., Fall 1989,
at 9, reprinted in LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE: PRIVATE COMMITMENTS, PUBLIC
CEREMONIES 13 (Suzanne Sherman ed., 1992) [hereinafter LESBIAN AND GAY MAR-
RIAGE]; Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal Marriage Rights for Lesbians
and Gay Men and the Intracommunity Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE
567 (1994).
30. For intracommunity arguments against seeking the right to marry, see Paula
Ettelbrick, Since When is Marriage a Path to Liberation, OUT/LOOK, NAT'L GAY
& LESBIAN Q., Fall 1989, at 9, reprinted in LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE, supra
note 29, at 20; Steven K. Homer, Against Marriage, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 505
(1994); Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and
Lesbian Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Mar-
riage," 79 VA. L. REV. 1535 (1993).
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ways. I suggest that autonomy-denying sex causes women to dis-
associate the bodily self from the conscious experiencing self and
harms women in a number of ways. Women in heterosexual rela-
tionships are at greater risk of experiencing autonomy-denying
sex than are women in lesbian relationships. I do not, however,
propose any direct bans on hazardous relationships. Women en-
gaged in such relationships, whether "sex workers," 31 girlfriends,
or wives, may well be right in thinking that such relationships are
their best available option today.
In Part IV, I argue that for some (many?) women, sexuality
is far more fluid than our current understanding of sexual orien-
tation allows and that contemporary taboos on lesbian relation-
ships have the effect of facilitating heterosexual men's
exploitation of women.
In Part V, I briefly apply the principle developed here to the
constitutional issue of whether bans on lesbian marriage discrimi-
nate on the basis of sex in violation of the equality provision of
the Fourteenth Amendment. I conclude that the denial of mar-
riage rights to lesbian couples constitutes sex discrimination
against women on both formal and substantive levels.
II. TRADITIONAL ARGUMENTS
Traditional moral and religious arguments against same-sex
relationships take one of two forms. One is the consequentialist
argument that such relationships tend to cause real-world
problems for those involved and their children, families, friends,
and society. The other argument is that homosexuality is inher-
ently immoral. I begin this Part with a brief discussion of the
consequentialist arguments against lesbian relationships. I then
describe and discuss the arguments that lesbian relationships are
inherently immoral.
A. Consequentialist Arguments Against Lesbian Relationships
Arguments about the evils caused by same-sex relationships
take one of five forms: (1) homosexuality causes high levels of
promiscuity and sexually transmitted disease; (2) homosexuality
leads to sexual abuse of children by adults; (3) acceptance of ho-
mosexual relationships will result in fewer good homes and con-
fusing role models for children; (4) acceptance of same-sex
31. Sex workers refers to people who work for wages in the sex industry and
includes nude dancers, prostitutes, and phone sex workers.
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relationships threatens the stability of marriage; and (5) hetero-
sexuality is necessary in order to civilize men. In this Subpart, I
describe these objections to lesbian relationships and assess the
extent to which they are supported by any evidence.
1. Promiscuity and Disease. Some moral conservatives base
objections to same-sex relationships on the connections between
homosexuality, promiscuity, and disease, citing evidence of the
high prevalence of AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases
in the homosexual population. 32 In fact, lesbians have the lowest
rates of sexually transmitted disease ("STD") of any sexually-ac-
"tive group, significantly lower than heterosexuals. 33 If a connec-
tion -exists between sexually transmitted diseases and
promiscuity, then lesbians are less promiscuous than either heter-
osexuals or gay men.34
2. Sexual Abuse of Children. Moral conservatives regard
homosexual adults as more likely to prey on children than heter-
32. See GEORGE GRANT & MARK A. HORNE, LEGISLATING IMMORALITY: THE
HOMOSEXUAL MOVEMENT COMES OUT OF THE CLOSET 34-37, 123-41 (1993); Roger
Scruton, Gay Reservations, in THE LIBERATION DEBATE: RIGHTS AT ISSUE 122
(Michael Leahy & Dan Cohn-Sherbok eds., 1996).
33. See ANN DUECY NORMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., LESBIAN AND BISEXUAL WOMEN IN SMALL CITIES - AT RISK FOR HIV?
(1996); American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on Adolescence, Homosexual-
ity and Adolescence, 92 PEDIATRICS 631, 632 (1993) (women who have sex only with
other women have low rates for all STDs). Most lesbians who contract HIV sexually
acquire the infection through unprotected heterosexual activity (often with gay or
bisexual men or injection drug users). See S. MILLS ET AL., SAN FRANCISCO DEP'T
OF PUBLIC HEALTH, HEALTH BEHAVIORS AMONG LESBIAN AND BISEXUAL WO-
MEN: A COMMUNITY-BASED WOMEN'S HEALTH SURVEY (1993) (on file with au-
thor); P.E. STEVENS, LYON-MARTIN WOMEN'S HEALTH SERVS., HIV RISK
REDUCTION FOR THREE SUBGROUPS OF LESBIAN AND BISEXUAL WOMEN IN SAN
FRANCISCO (1993) (on file with author). The medical literature reports only isolated
incidences of woman-to-woman transmission of the virus. See S.Y. CHU, CENTERS
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, ORAL COMMUNICATION (1993); S.Y. Chu
et al., Epidemiology of Reported Cases of AIDS in Lesbians, 80 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
1380-81 (1990); Maria T. Sabatini et al., Kaposi's Sarcoma and T-cell Lymphoma in
an Immunodeficient Woman: A Case Report, 1 AIDS RES. 135 (1983); Josiah D.
Rich et al., Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Presumed to Have Oc-
curred Via Female Homosexual Contact, 17 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1003
(1993); Peter Greenhouse, Letter to the Editor, Female-to-Female Transmission of
HIV, LANCET, Aug. 15, 1987, at 401; Michael Marmor et al., Letter to the Editor,
Possible Female-to-Female Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 105
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 969 (1986); Samuel Perry et al., Letter to the Editor,
Orogenital Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), 111 ANNALS IN-
TERNAL MED. 951 (1989).
34. There is no data directly comparing promiscuity among lesbians and among
heterosexuals.
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osexual adults.35 Although this fear is primarily directed at gay
men, it is occasionally directed at lesbians. Reliable data on child
abuse is notoriously difficult to obtain because of problems with
memory, underreporting, shame, and denial. However, existing
data suggests that heterosexual men are overwhelmingly respon-
sible for child abuse.36 Most child abuse involves adult male
abuse of a young female,37 and gay men appear no more likely
than heterosexual men 38 to abuse children.39 There is no evi-
dence suggesting that lesbians pose any special danger to
children. 40
35. See GRANT & HORNE, supra note 32, at 38-43; The Ramsey Colloquium,
The Homosexual Movement, 41 FIRST THINGS 15, 19 (1994) (advocating discrimina-
tion against lesbians and gay men in education programs when "the intent is to pre-
vent predatory behavior").
36. See Charlotte J. Patterson, Children of Lesbian and Gay Parents, 63 CHILD
DEV. 1025, 1034 (1992).
37. See CHILDREN'S Div., AM. HUMANE ASS'N, PROTECTING THE CHILD VIC-
TIM OF SEX CRIMES COMMITTED BY ADULTS 216-17 (Vincent De Francis ed., 1969)
(stating that 90% of victims of sexual abuse are female); Carole Jenny et al., Are
Children at Risk for Sexual Abuse by Homosexuals?, 94 PEDIATRICS 41, 42 (1994) (in
a study of 352 cases of suspected child sexual abuse, 269 cases involved abuse by
adults. Of those cases, 81.5% of the victims were female).
38. See Gregory M. Herek, Myths About Sexual Orientation: A Lawyer's Guide
to Social Science Research, 1 L. & SEXUALITY 133, 156 (1991) (reviewing the litera-
ture relating to adult sexual orientation and molestation of children and concluding
that gay men are not more likely than heterosexual men to molest children); Jenny
et al., supra note 37, at 42 (in 269 suspected cases of child sexual abuse, 96.4% of the
abusers were heterosexual males). In fact, the most dangerous group of abusers
appear to be heterosexual relatives of abused children and heterosexual partners of
their close relatives. See id. (noting that over 80% of abusers were heterosexual
partners of a close relative of the victim); see also Glen Kercher & Marily McShane,
Characterizing Child Sexual Abuse on the Basis of a Multi-Agency Sample, 9 Vic-
TIMOLOGY 364, 370-79 (1984) (reporting that 40.6% of male perpetrators were fa-
thers or stepfathers of the victim).
39. See A. Nicholas Groth & Ann Wolbert Burgess, Male Rape: Offenders and
Victims, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 806 (study of 22 male rape cases finding only 2
perpetrators who led predominantly homosexual lifestyles); A. Nicholas Groth &
H.J. Birnbaum, Adult Sexual Orientation and Attraction to Underage Persons, 7
ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 175 (1978); Jenny et al., supra note 37, at 42 (noting that
of 269 incidents of child abuse, 18.5% of the victims were male and 81.5% of the
victims were female. For males only 1 abuser (2%) was gay. For females none of
the abusers were gay); Mary J. Spencer & Patricia Dunklee, Sexual Abuse of Boys,
78 PEDIATRICS 133, 135 (1986) (in 140 cases of male child abuse studied, 4 of the
male perpetrators were known homosexuals).
40. See Jenny et al., supra note 37, at 42 (of 219 incidents of female child abuse,
1 was committed by a lesbian (0.4%) and 6 were committed by heterosexual women
(2.7%). For additional authority, see BARBARA MCCOMB JONES ET AL., U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN: SELECTED READ-
INGS; E.M. DiLapi, Lesbian Mothers and the Motherhood Hierarchy, in HOMOSEXU-
ALITY AND THE FAMILY 101 (Frederick W. Bozett ed., 1989); David Finkelhor & D.
Russell, Women as Perpetrator: Review of the Evidence, in CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE:
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3. Acceptance of Homosexuality Will Result in Fewer Good
Homes and Confusing Role Models for Children. Many believe
that, all else being equal, children are best raised by two biologi-
cal parents. Children adopted by strangers are at greater risk
than children living with their biological parents along a number
of dimensions,41 and sometimes feel abandoned by their genetic
parents, particularly their mothers.42 The argument that children
should be raised by their natural parents was the main justifica-
tion offered at trial by the state of Hawaii for its ban on same-sex
marriage.4 3 Adoption problems arise with adoption, however,
NEW THEORY AND RESEARCH 171 (David Finkelhor ed., 1984); Patterson, supra
note 36; E.P. Sarafino, An Estimate of Nationwide Incidence of Sexual Offenses
Against Children, 58 CHILD WELFARE 127 (1979). One study reports that children
of gay or lesbian parents are less likely to become victims of parental sexual or
physical abuse. See A.H. Fishel, Gay Parents, 4 ISSUES HEALTH CARE WOMEN 139
(1983).
41. See David M. Brodzinsky, Adjustment to Adoption: A Psychosocial Perspec-
tive, 7 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 25, 29 (1987) ("on average adopted children are
more likely to manifest psychological problems than nonadopted children");
Deborah A. Frank et al., Infants and Young Children in Orphanages: One View from
Pediatrics and Child Psychiatry, 97 PEDIATRICS 569, 573 (citing B. Tizard & J.
Hodges, The Effect of Early Institutional Rearing on the Development of Eight-Year-
Old Children, J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 99 (1978) (study of children who
had been institutionalized, then adopted in the first two years of life. The children
did adapt well to adoptive homes but a disproportionate number had psychiatric
problems)). On bonding and attachment see CHRISTINE ADAMEC & WILLIAM L.
PIERCE, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ADOPTION 71 (1991) (referencing study showing
that children adopted before age four bonded well with their parents while children
who were adopted over age four experienced problems bonding); MIRIAM REITZ &
KENNETH W. WATSON, ADOPTION AND THE FAMILY SYSTEM 133 (1992) (unlike
birth bonding, attachment is ordinarily learned through nurturing interaction be-
tween parent and child during the first three years of life and if that nurturing has
been inadequate, intermittent, or traumatically interrupted, a child may suffer from
an attachment disorder); Leslie M. Singer et al., Mother-Infant Attachment in Adop-
tive Families, 56 CHILD DEV. 1543, 1550 (1985) (mother-infant attachment is the
same in adoptive and nonadoptive families of infants but the older the child is at the
time of adoption, the more likely he or she is to have behavioral problems).
42. Paul M. Brinich, Some Potential Effects of Adoption on Self and Object Rep-
resentations, 35 PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY CHILD 107 (1980); Steven L. Nickman,
Challenges of Adoption, 12 HARV. MENTAL HEALTH LETTER 5 (1996) (adoptees
have lower self-esteem because of apparent abandonment or rejection by birth
parents).
43. See Baehr v. Miike, No. CIV.91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec.
3, 1996). The trial court reported:
[d]efense counsel acknowledged Defendant's burden of proof and, in
pertinent part, stated the following in his opening statement. "The
State has a compelling interest in promoting the optimal development
of children .... It is the State's policy to pursue the optimal develop-
ment of children, to unite children with their mothers and fathers, and
to have mothers and fathers take responsibility for their child."
Id. at *3.
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not lesbian parenting. Children adopted by unrelated lesbian
couples, like children adopted by unrelated heterosexual couples,
would not live with a genetic parent regardless of whether the
adoption is allowed or whether their parents are allowed to
marry. Fewer and fewer children have the ability to live out their
childhoods with both biological parents.44 The more we stress
the overwhelming importance of living in two-biological-parent
homes, the more we harm children and their parents who cannot
live in such ideal families by telling them that they do not have a
"real" parent-child relationship.
Most children raised by lesbian parents are the biological
child of one of their mothers. If the biologic mother has lived
throughout the child's life in a stable family unit with another
person to whom the child is not biologically linked (stepfather,
adoptive father, adoptive second mother, or nonadoptive second
mother), we know nothing about whether the child - like the
child adopted by strangers 45 - will be at greater risk than if the
biological mother were living with the biological father. The
most analogous situation would be a child born within a stable
heterosexual relationship as a result of artificial insemination. In
this situation, the absence of a biological link to the father may
be of relatively little importance. Artificial insemination of a wo-
man in a heterosexual relationship is allowed although the child
will not live in a home with two biological parents. Indeed, even
Hawaii's experts conceded that risky situations arise routinely
with heterosexuals today without any legal prohibitions. For ex-
ample, in second marriage situations, children of the mother's
first marriage live with an adoptive or stepfather to whom they
are not biologically related rather than with their biological fa-
ther with whom they lived earlier.46 Yet we do not therefore pro-
44. See Kay Weiler & Lelia B. Helms, Who's in Charge? Guardianships and
Children, 17 MCN AM. J. MATERNAL CHILD NURSING 232 (1992) (between 1970
and 1989 the proportion of children in the United States living with both parents
dropped from 85% to 73%).
45. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
46. See W.D. Erickson et al., The Life Histories and Psychological Profiles of 59
Incestuous Stepfathers, 15 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCH. & L. 349-57 (1987) (incest is
both more common and more severe in stepparent families); Stephanie Kasen et al.,
A Multi-Risk Interaction Model: Effects of Temperment and Divorce on Psychiatric
Disorders in Children, 24 J. ABNORMAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 121 (1996) ("In compari-
son with youths in intact families, youths living in stepfamilies were at increased risk
for ADHD and conduct disorders."); Diana E.H. Russell, The Prevalence and Seri-
ousness of Incestuous Abuse: Stepfathers vs. Biological Fathers, 8 CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT 15 (1984) (finding that in random sample of 930 adult women, 17% of
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hibit divorced mothers from remarrying or living again with a
man, though there is evidence that children in such homes are at
special risk.
Part of the concern about lesbians as parents, caretakers, or
teachers of children is that lesbians cannot be effective role mod-
els of (heterosexual) women and men. Children "exposed" to
lesbians may be confused about gender and sexuality. This con-
cern often affects custody following a divorce. 47 Many courts
routinely award custody to a heterosexual father rather than a
lesbian mother for fear that child might have difficulty becoming
heterosexual, might be teased by other children, or might be in-
jured in some unspecified way.48
There are a number of empirical studies of children raised
by lesbian mothers.49 Most studies report that the children of
those who had lived with a stepfather in childhood were sexually abused while 2%
of those who lived with a biological father were abused by him. These statistics
illustrate that the abuse by stepfathers was more severe). On the prevalence of the
risk that a child will live in a heterosexual stepfamily, see Virginia Rutter, Lessons
from Stepfamilies, PSYCHOL. TODAY, May-June 1994, at 30 (noting that by the year
2000, stepfamilies will outnumber all other family types).
47. For empirical evidence of risk in children in stepfamilies, see, for example,
Donald H. Stone, The Moral Dilemma: Child Custody When One Parent is Homo-
sexual or Lesbian - An Empirical Study, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 711, 722-25 (1989);
Robert G. Bagnall et al., Comment, Burdens on Gay Litigants and Bias in the Court
System, 19 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 498 (1984).
48. See Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 108 (Va. 1995) (awarding custody
of child to grandmother in part because the mother is a lesbian); Roe v. Roe, 324
S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985) ("the conditions under which this child must live daily are
not only unlawful but also impose an intolerable burden" upon the child because of
"social condemnation.., which will inevitably afflict her relationship with her peers
and with the community at large."); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 79, 81
(N.D. 1981) (awarding custody to heterosexual father stating that "we cannot lightly
dismiss the fact that living in the same house with their mother and her [lesbian]
lover may well cause the children to 'suffer from the slings and arrows of a disap-
proving society."'); In re Marriage of Williams, 563 N.E.2d 1195, 1197 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990) (supporting heterosexual father's claim to custody over the claim of the child's
lesbian mother, noting father's wish to provide for the child's "moral upbringing,
self-esteem, and the traditional type family setting .. "); M.J.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d
966, 968-69 (Okla. 1982) (court worried about many potential detrimental effects).
49. Like all work in this area, much of this research suffers methodological
problems. For example, some studies compare single-divorced heterosexual women
with lesbians in stable lesbian relationships. See Susan Golombok et al., Children of
Lesbian and Single Parent Households: Psychosexual and Psychiatric Appraisal, 24 J.
CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 551 (1983); Richard Green, The Best Interests of
the Child with Lesbian Mother, 10 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCH. & L. 7, 7-15 (1982)
[hereinafter Green, Best Interests]; Richard Green et al., Lesbian Mothers and their
Children: A Comparison with Solo Parent Heterosexual Mothers and their Children,
15 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAV. 167 (1986) [hereinafter Green, Lesbian Mothers].
Others rely on mothers' reports, and mothers may be unlikely to perceive or report
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lesbian mothers do not differ in statistically significant ways from
the children of heterosexuals with respect to sexual orientation,50
gender identity,51 gender role, 52 self-esteem,53 psychological
problems related to either divorce or their sexuality. See Golombok, supra. Some
use samples so small that differences are dismissed as statistically insignificant.
More fundamentally, problems may not be measurable. Questions have also been
raised with regard to sampling issues, statistical power, and other technical matters.
See Phillip A. Belcastro et al., A Review of Data Based Studies Addressing the Af-
fects of Homosexual Parenting on Children's Sexual and Social Functioning, 20 J.
DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 105 (1993) (citing lack of external validity because of
difficulty of determining the universe of gay parents, poor control groups, and small
sample sizes). Little is known about development of the offspring of gay or lesbian
parents during adolescence or adulthood. Longitudinal studies that follow lesbian
and-gay families over time are badly needed. See Charlotte J. Patterson, Adoption
of Minor Children by Lesbian and Gay Adults: A Social Science Perspective, 2 Duke
J. Gender L. & Pol'y 191, 203 (1995) [hereinafter Patterson, Adoption].
For a discussion of methodological problems from an opponent of same-sex
marriage, see Lynn Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Chil-
dren, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 833. But Wardle himself makes a number of questionable
assumptions. He views a girl growing up to be lesbian rather than heterosexual as
problematic. Id. at 621. He reports that:
[T]hree of the thirteen lesbian mothers [in one study] preferred for
their daughters to become homosexual, compared to none of the fif-
teen heterosexual single mothers, and all of the heterosexual mothers
(100%), hoped their children would marry and have children, but only
nine of thirteen lesbian mothers (69%) wanted their children to have
children.
Id. Although the lesbian mothers are much more open than the heterosexual
mothers to their children growing up with a sexuality different from their own, War-
die sees the only possible problem is that more lesbian mothers would like their
daughters to be lesbians. In this Article, I argue that there are good reasons for that
preference. I also assert that heterosexual marriage and children under contempo-
rary arrangements are problematic for women. Wardle assumes that having a
mother who sees such problems is a disadvantage for a daughter.
50. See M. Neil Browne & Andrea Giampetro, The Contribution of Social Sci-
ence Data to the Adjudication of Child Custody Disputes?, 15 CAP. U. L. REV. 43,48-
49 (1985); Nanette Gartrell et al., The National Lesbian Family Study, 66 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 272-73 (1996); Golombok, supra note 49, at 564; Mary B. Harris
& Pauline H. Turner, Gay and Lesbian Parents, 12 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 101, 103
(1986); Ann O'Connell, Voices from the Heart: The Developmental Impact of a
Mother's Lesbianism on Her Adolescent Children, 63 SMITH C. STUD. Soc. WORK
281 (1993); Patterson, supra note 36, at 1031-32.
51. See Richard Green, Sexual Identity of 37 Children Raised by Homosexual or
Transsexual Parents, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 692, 696 (1978).
52. See Gartrell et al., supra note 50, at 272-73; Charlotte J. Patterson, Families
of the Lesbian Baby Boom: Parent's Division of Labor and Childrens' Adjustment,
31 DEVELOPMENTAL. PSYCHOL. 115 (1995) [hereinafter Patterson, Families]; Char-
lotte J. Patterson, Children of the Lesbian Baby Boom: Behavioral Adjustment, Self-
Concept, and Sex Role Identity, in LESBIAN AND GAY PSYCHOLOGY: THEORY, RE-
SEARCH AND CLINICAL APPLICATIONS 156, 169 (Beverly Greene & Gregory M.
Herek eds., 1994) [hereinafter Patterson, Baby Boom].
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health, 54 and social adjustment.5 5 Researchers have also found
that children of lesbian mothers do not differ from other children
in terms of "personal development, including separation-individ-
uation, locus of control, self-concept, intelligence, or moral
judgement, '' 56 and many studies show that "children of lesbian
mothers have normal, healthy relationships with other children
as well as with adults." 57
Children living with lesbian or gay parents do report some
teasing and harassment by other children, 58 but their problems
are probably no different from those of children in households in
which members encounter discrimination based upon race, cul-
ture, ethnicity, or socioeconomic class.59 Lesbian and heterosex-
ual mothers do not differ markedly in their approaches to child
rearing.60 Children of lesbian mothers reported greater stress
but also a greater overall sense of well being.61 The children of
53. See Patterson, Adoption, supra note 49, at 199 (reporting that twelve studies
found no differences in measures of self-esteem, behavior adjustment, or psychiatric
disorders).
54. See id.
55. See Gartrell et al., supra note 50, at 272-73.
56. Id.; see also Ailsa Steckel, Psychosocial Development of Children of Lesbian
Mothers, in GAY AND LESBIAN PARENrs 75 (Frederick W. Bozett ed., 1987) (finding
that separation-individuation process for children in heterosexual families was more
aggressive and that children in heterosexual families were more bossy and
domineering).
57. Gartrell et al., supra note 50, at 272-73.
58. See Green, supra note 51, at 695-96 (finding teasing relatively "minor and
transitory"); Devjani Mishra, The Road to Concord: Resolving the Conflict of Law
Over Adoption by Gays and Lesbians, 30 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 91, 99-100
(1996); cf. Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining
Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontradi-
tional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 568-69 n.588 (1990) (citing a 1986 survey which
found that 80% of the daughters and more than 80% of the sons of lesbian mothers
reported that they were liked "much more," "somewhat more," or "as much" by
their same-sex peers as other children in their class at school, as compared to 75% of
the daughters and more than 80% of the sons of heterosexual mothers).
59. See Patterson, Adoption, supra note 49, at 200-01.
60. See Beverly Hoeffer, Children's Acquisition of Sex-Role Behavior in Les-
bian-Mother Families, 51 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 536, 543 (1981); Sally L. Kwes-
kin & Alicia S. Cook, Heterosexual and Homosexual Mothers, Self-Described Sex-
Role Behavior and Ideal Sex-Role Behavior in Children, 8 SEx ROLES 967 (1982)
(finding that homosexual and heterosexual mothers do not differ in their sex role
behaviors and perceptions.); Terrie A. Lyons, Lesbian Mothers' Custody Fears, 2
WOMEN & THERAPY 232 (1983) (finding that lesbian and heterosexual single
mothers were similar in their likelihood to call upon family and other resources for
help in child rearing.); Judith A. Miller et al., The Child's Home Environment for
Lesbian vs Heterosexual Mothers: A Neglected Area of Research, 7 J. HOMOSEXUAL-
irY 49, 55 (1981).
61. See Patterson, Baby Boom, supra note 52, at 169.
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heterosexual mothers were more domineering and more often
engaged in power struggles than children of lesbian mothers.62
At least one study concludes that children raised by lesbian
mothers might be more likely to become lesbian or gay for a
number of reasons, including being raised in an environment
more permissive of same-sex relationships.63 Although children
raised in lesbian households might be more likely to identify as
lesbian or gay, this cannot be a problem for girls if, as I argue,
lesbian relationships are more moral than heterosexual relation-
ships in our culture today.
4. Family Stability. Many conservatives regard bans on
same-sex relationships as necessary to stabilize heterosexual mar-
riages. 64 The vast majority of heterosexual divorces today are
not due to homosexuality but to the fact that women and men in
intimate relationships often have different needs, desires, and
expectations.
Given these problems, acceptance of lesbian relationships
might actually destabilize heterosexual marriage, especially in
the short term. Were women to see lesbian relationships as a
viable option, some might prefer more equitable relationships
with women to less equitable relationships with men. For women
already married to men, acceptance of lesbian relationships
might affect divorce rates. But such instability may well be nec-
essary if men are to have the incentive to eliminate inequities in
heterosexual relationships in the foreseeable future. The trade-
off may be between increased marital instability, particularly in
62. See Steckel, supra note 56, at 81.
63. See Ghazala Afzal Javaid, The Children of Homosexual and Heterosexual
Single Mother, 23 CHILD PSYCHIATRY & HUMAN DEV. 235, 236 (1993). A critical
review of three summaries of the literature concludes that there is evidence that
"homosexual parents appear to produce a disproportionate percentage of bisexual
and homosexual children." Paul Cameron et al., Errors by the American Psychiatric
Association, the American Psychological Association, and the National Education
Association in Representing Homosexuality in Amicus Briefs About Amendment 2 to
the U.S. Supreme Court, 79 PSYCHOL. REP. 383, 389 (1996). Nine to twelve percent
of children raised by lesbian or gay parents were reported to be lesbian or gay. Id.
64. See J. Harvie Wilkinson III & G. Edward White, Constitutional Protection
for Personal Lifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 563, 595-96 (1977); GRANT & HORNE,
supra note 32, at 97-99. Often the need for family stability is stressed in conjunction
with the preceding points - the need to restrain promiscuity and the belief that
children are best off in a traditional family. See, e.g., The Ramsey Colloquium,
supra note 35, at 17 ("Marriage and the family - husband, wife, and children,
joined by public recognition and legal bond - are the most effective institutions for
the rearing of children, the directing of sexual passion, and human flourishing in
community.").
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the short term, and greater equality between the sexes within and
outside of heterosexual marriage.
The focus should not be whether lesbian relationships might
destabilize heterosexual marriage. Rather, the pertinent ques-
tion is whether lesbian relationships should be taboo in order to
increase the pressure on women to enter into or to remain in
heterosexual relationships in which they do more than their
share of emotional, domestic, and reproductive work for less
than their share of the benefits. To ask this question however, is
to answer it for purposes of this Article. If the traditional moral
norm against lesbian relationships is one aspect of the social
structure facilitating the subordination and exploitation of wo-
men by men, then it is illegitimate.
5. Men Need the Civilizing Effects of Living in Stable Family
Units with Women and Children. One argument repeatedly
made for heterosexual marriage is that men will otherwise be-
have in violent and irresponsible ways if they are not living in
stable family units with women and children. Only stable (heter-
osexual) marriage will produce moral men, responsible fathers,
and civilized relationships between the sexes. Proponents of this
argument claim that men in families are more likely to be em-
ployed than other men, to work harder, and to be more responsi-
ble members of their communities. 65 "[U]nattached males roam
the interstices between socially cohesive groups, kill, and are
themselves killed and maimed. '66
There is something particularly odd about the moral argu-
ment that bans on same-sex relationships are necessary to civilize
men in light of the dangers women face in intimate relationships
with men. Women are more likely to be victims of the men they
live with than of the strangers "roam[ing] the interstices" of soci-
ety.67 This argument requires that women nevertheless live with
65. See Karl Zinsmeister, Marriage as the Male Antidote, 7 AM. ENTERPRISE 46
(1996) (Family men are less violent and less likely to be killed by other men.).
66. Id.
67. Women are two to three times as likely to be sexually assaulted by a hus-
band than by a stranger. See DAVID FINKELHOR & KERSTI YLLO, LICENSE TO
RAPE: SEXUAL ABUSE OF WIVES 205 (1985) (reporting that 10% of a representative
sample of women in the Boston area, with children between 6 and 14 in their cus-
tody, had been raped by husbands; only 3% reported having been raped by a stran-
ger); DIANA E.H. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE 57-64 (1982) (noting that in a
representative sample of women 18 and over in the San Francisco area, 14% of
married women report rape by husbands while only half as many reported having
been raped by a stranger). Women are also more likely to be murdered after mar-
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men, hopefully civilizing them successfully, but, when that does
not happen, they become men's victims. Many men are violent
and abusive to their female partners because violence allows
them to dominate their families. 68 Such control cannot be legiti-
mate in moral terms just because men would be even more vio-
lent outside such relationships.
A more moral approach would not sacrifice women for
men's moral "development." Men would be expected to behave
morally on their own, and both lesbian and heterosexual rela-
tionships would be accepted and honored when moral. Under
this approach, I suspect that heterosexual men would be less vio-
lent in a society more tolerant of lesbian relationships. The pri-
mary long-term effect of respecting lesbian relationships might
be to change the terms of heterosexual relationships, pressuring
heterosexual men to be more equitable, respectful, and less vio-
lent in their relationships with women. 69
In this Subpart, I have reviewed the consequentialist argu-
ments that lesbian relationships cause promiscuity and sexually
transmitted diseases, sexual abuse of children, fewer good homes
and role models for children, marital instability, and less civilized
men. The first two are unsupported by or inconsistent with the
empirical evidence: we have no evidence that lesbians are more
promiscuous than heterosexual men, and they have the lowest
risk of STD of any sexually active group. With respect to chil-
dren, the evidence indicates that lesbians are not likely to abuse
children and are fit parents, even though there is some evidence
that children raised by lesbians might be more likely to identify
as lesbian or gay. This difference, however, even if established
by reliable data, cannot justify discrimination against lesbians be-
cause women are more likely to find moral intimate relationships
with other women than with men. The last two justifications _'
family stability and civilization of men - sacrifice women for
stability of often hazardous family structures in which women do
riage than before. See DEE L.R. GRAHAM, LOVING TO SURVIVE: SEXUAL TERROR,
MEN'S VIOLENCE, AND WOMEN'S LIVES 71 (1994). Women are beaten .most often
by the men they live with. See G.D. Rath et al., Rates of Domestic Violence Against
Adult Women by Men Partners, 2 J. AM. BOARD FAM. PRAC. 227 (1989) (reporting
that boyfriends not cohabitating were least abusive, while couples together for four
to six years had more domestic violence than other couples).
68. See Richard M. Tolman & Larry W. Bennett, A Review of Quantitative Re-
search on Men Who Batter, 5 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 87 (1990) (reporting
characteristics of male batterers).
69. See infra Part IV.
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more than their share of the work for less than their share of the
benefits.
B. The Inherent Moral Superiority of Heterosexuality
In this Subpart, I describe two major forms of the argument
that committed heterosexual marital relationships are morally su-
perior to all other sexual liaisons. I suggest two problems with
this argument and identify one important insight - the harm of
disassociation of the physical and conscious selves - which I de-
velop further in discussing the immorality of autonomy-denying
sex in Part III.
1. Committed Heterosexual Marital Relationships are More
Selfless and Transcendental. Some argue that committed noncon-
tracepted heterosexual marital intercourse is morally superior in
that only such sex is self-giving and the kind of sex act that can be
reproductive. According to scholar John Finnis, only such inter-
course can be the actualization of the union of the two people
both biologically and personally:
Sexual acts cannot in reality be self-giving unless they are
acts by which a man and a woman actualize and experience
sexually the real giving of themselves to each other in biologi-
cal, affective, and volitional union in mutual commitment,
both open-ended and exclusive - which ... we call marriage.
In short, sexual acts are not unitive in their significance
unless they are marital (actualizing the all-level unity of mar-
riage) and (since the common good of marriage has two as-
pects) they are not marital unless they have not only the
generosity of acts of friendship but also the procreative signifi-
cance, not necessarily of being intended to generate or capable
in the circumstances of generating but at least of being, as
human conduct, acts of the reproductive kind - actualiza-
tions, so far as the spouses then and there can, of the repro-
ductive function in which they are biologically and thus
personally one.70
2. Heterosexual Intercourse in a Committed Marital Rela-
tionship is an Inherent Good Whereas Other Forms of Sexual
Conduct are Not. Some contend that committed heterosexual
marital relationships are morally superior because heterosexual
intercourse is an inherent - not just instrumental - good
whereas other forms of sexual conduct threaten personal integ-
70. John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation," 69 NOTRE DAME
L. Rnv. 1049, 1067 (1994).
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rity by alienating one's bodily self from one's consciously exper-
iencing self. Scholars Robert George and Gerard Bradley make
this point:
[T]he intrinsic point of sex in any marriage, fertile or not, is, in
our view, the basic good of marriage itself ... consummated
and actualized by acts of the reproductive type. Such acts
alone among sexual acts can be truly unitive, and thus marital;
and marital acts, thus understood, have their intelligibility and
value intrinsically, and not merely by virtue of their capacity to
facilitate the realization of other goods.71
It is key that neither marriage nor marital intercourse is instru-
mental, i.e., a means to other extrinsic ends such as pleasure, pro-
creation, or emotional intimacy. George and Bradley regard
pleasure and procreation as valuable effects of marital inter-
course. But if pleasure or procreation motivate intercourse, sex
damages personal integrity by transforming the body into a
means to other ends, alienating one's bodily self from one's con-
scious self.72 These writers therefore view all sex for any end
71. Robert P. George & Gerard V. Bradley, Marriage and the Liberal Imagina-
tion, 84 GEO. L.J. 301, 305 (1995). John Finnis also makes this point about the inher-
ent goodness of heterosexual marital intercourse: "Homosexual orientation in this
sense is, in fact, a standing denial of the intrinsic aptness of sexual intercourse to
actualize and in that sense give expression to the exclusiveness and open-ended
commitment of marriage as something good in itself." John M. Finnis, Law Moral-
ity, and "Sexual Orientation," 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 11, 32
(1995).
72. George and Bradley explain the harm of alienation:
The body, as part of the personal reality of the human being, may not
be treated as a mere instrument without damaging the integrity of the
acting person as a dynamic unity of body, mind, and spirit. To treat
one's own body, or the body of another, as a pleasure-inducing
machine, for example, or as a mere instrument of procreation, is to
alienate one part of the self, namely, one's consciously experiencing
(and desiring) self, from another, namely, one's bodily self. But these
parts are, in truth, metaphysically inseparable parts of the person as a
whole. Their existential separation in acts that instrumentalize the
body for the sake of extrinsic goals, such as producing experiences de-
sired purely for the satisfaction of the conscious self, disintegrates the
acting person as such.
So, in our view, while sexual intercourse is valuable and morally good
when it actualizes (and, thus, allows spouses to experience) the one-
flesh communion of their marriage, sex that is wholly instrumentalized
is intrinsically morally bad, even when the ultimate goals to which or-
gasmic activity is chosen as a means (for example, sharing a pleasura-
ble experience, getting a good night's sleep, expressing tender feelings,
generating feelings of closeness) are in themselves innocent and even
desirable.
George & Bradley, supra note 71, at 314.
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such as pleasure or reproduction as damaging to personal integ-
rity. George and Bradley concede that "[i]ntrinsic value cannot,
strictly speaking, be demonstrated. Qua basic, the value of in-
trinsic goods cannot be derived through a middle terms. '73
It is not that pleasure is bad, but that "it is contrary to rea-
son - bad and immoral - to sacrifice one's psychosomatic in-
tegrity, or to instrumentalize a part of oneself, for the sake of
some desired experience, whether it is getting drunk, enjoying a
psychedelic drug trip, or having an orgasm. ' '74 George and Brad-
73. Id. at 307.
In the end, we think, one either understands that spousal genital inter-
course has a special significance as instantiating a basic, noninstru-
mental value, or something blocks that understanding and one does
not perceive correctly. For the most part, our liberal friends... do not
see any special point or value in such intercourse. For them, spouses
have no reason, apart from purely subjective preference, ever to
choose genital intercourse over oral or anal intercourse. And because
oral and anal intercourse are available to same-sex couples, such
couples have as much interest in marriage and as much right to marry
as couples of opposite sexes.
Id.
By contrast, many other people perceive quite easily the special value
and significance of the genital intercourse of spouses, and see that this
value and significance obtains even for spouses who are incapable of
having children, or any more children. They are therefore confident
that sodomitical acts cannot be marital (though they divide over the
question whether contracepted intercourse retains its marital quality).
Thus, as a matter of common sense, they deny that marriage, as a
moral reality, is possible for couples of the same sex.
Id.
The central issue can be brought into focus by considering the case of
an elderly married couple who simply no longer experience pleasure in
their acts of genital intercourse. They are, however, still physiologi-
cally capable of performing such acts and can do so without emotional
repugnance. Is there any point in their continuing to perform them?
Can it be reasonable for them to do so, at least occasionally, as a way
of actualizing and experiencing their marriage as a one-flesh union?
We say yes. We suspect that ... liberals would say no. Our answer is
valid if marriage, and the genital acts that actualize it, are intrinsically
good, and, thus, have an intelligible point even apart from their capac-
ity to produce pleasure.
Id. at 309-10.
74. Id. at 316. What of chewing sugarless gum or eating only for pleasure? Are
such activities immoral because the body is used instrumentally in these activities?
George and Bradley explain:
Chewing gum, rocking in a chair, and taking a walk are examples of
"innocent pleasures." The pleasure they provide is effortlessly inte-
grated with larger projects (such as concentrated thinking), and for
most people these activities present no hazard to any aspect of the
person's well-being .... The important point is that in the activity of
chewing gum, no existential separation of the bodily self and the con-
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ley believe their moral view is the only one available to distin-
guish between the morality of some sex and the immorality of
other sex, such as bestiality, adultery, or prostitution.75
The conviction that heterosexuality is inherently morally su-
perior to homosexuality is difficult to respond to because one
either sees the moral superiority of noncontracepted heterosex-
ual intercourse in marriage or one does not.76 I do not, there-
fore, try to disprove these points. I do, however, discuss two
problems with the arguments outlined above. First, there are
several problems with the line these authors draw between non-
contracepted heterosexual intercourse in marriage and all other
sexual acts. Second, they present an idealized and very male
view of what constitutes moral sex. Women are likely to find sex
alienating and harmful to personal integrity under circumstances
quite different from those regarded as problematic by Finnis,
George, and Bradley.
I begin with the line drawn between noncontracepted heter-
osexual intercourse in marriage and all other sexual activity, in-
cluding contracepted sex in marriage and oral or anal sex. This
distinction cannot justify the denial of marriage rights to lesbian
and gay couples given that the Constitution already protects the
sale of contraceptives to married and unmarried heterosexual
couples. 77 The line drawn by Finnis, George, and Bradley there-
fore cannot support the current constitutional regime, which pro-
sciously experiencing self is typically effected. In that activity, the
body is not typically commandeered into the service of a project that is
fully and accurately described (and, thus morally specified) as produc-
ing pleasure, whether as an end in itself or as means to other ends.
Id. at 317.
75. See id. at 318. George and Bradley contend:
Our view about the disintegrative quality of nonmarital sex tends to
strike liberals as exceedingly odd. Something like our view, however,
must be affirmed by anyone who supposes.., that there can be some-
thing morally wrong, and not merely imprudent, about some forms of
consensual sex. "Sexual liberationists" can afford casually to dismiss
the idea that sex can damage integrity. They have no interest in devel-
oping a principled moral critique of consensual adultery, promiscuity,
prostitution ("sex work"), bestiality, and the like. Liberals who reject
liberationism, however, had better take care before dismissing our
view.
Id.
76. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
77. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (finding it unconstitutional to
ban the sale of contraceptives to unmarried couples); Griswald v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965) (finding it unconstitutional to ban the sale of contraceptives to mar-
ried couples).
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tects much immoral heterosexual sex but does not protect lesbian
or gay sex.
Moreover, this view has roots in mysogenistic strands of
Christianity. It reflects the recurring Christian distrust of the
body and its pleasures, particularly sex - a distrust particularly
strong in Roman Catholicism. 78 As Karen Armstrong and other
feminist theologians have argued, the Catholic Church's unwill-
ingness to allow married couples to use birth control comes from
the Catholic denial that sexual pleasure is good in itself.79 Be-
cause Catholics have not seen sex as a good in itself, the theoreti-
cal potential of procreation is necessary as "justification" to
avoid sin.80 Obsession with sexual sin, which has existed in many
forms of Christianity,81 is linked with the perception of woman as
evil because she is sexual (tempting man to sin)8 2 or as pure an-
gel because she is virginal and asexual.83 Both views of woman
- the whore and the virgin - deny women agency, particularly
sexual agency, respect, and human status.
A second problem with the argument that noncontracepted
marital heterosexual intercourse is inherently morally superior to
all other sex is that it describes an idealized male84 experience.8 5
78. See Michael J. Perry, The Morality of Homosexual Conduct: A Response to
John Finnis, 9 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 41, 66 (1995) (noting that
the position Finnis defends is the "official" position of the Roman Catholic Church,
but not the position of all Christians or even all Catholic Christians). See also Carlos
Ball, Moral Foundations For A Discourse On Same-Sex Marriage: Looking Beyond
Political Liberalism, 85 GEO. L.J. 1871, 1918 (1997) (pointing out the conclusory
nature of Finnis's assertions about the moral superiority of heterosexuality and not-
ing that he is in the end, doing "nothing more than giv[ing] a secular gloss to the
traditional positions of the Catholic Church in matters of sexual ethics .... ").
79. See generally KAREN ARMSTRONG, THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO WOMAN:
CHRISTIANITY'S CREATION OF THE SEX WAR IN THE WEST (1986). Armstrong dis-
cusses Christianity's problem dealing with sex and the connection between the deni-
gration of sex and the demonization of woman, the temptress.
80. See Ball, supra note 78, at 1910-12.
81. See ARMSTRONG, supra note 79, at 1-51 (documenting the rejection of mar-
riage and the family by the West and Christianity because sexual activity was seen at
best as inconsistent with holiness and often as inherently sinful).
82. See id. at 58-87 (documenting Christian view of woman as Eve, the tempt-
ress, and evil because sexual).
83. See id. at 73-75 ("[B]y making women perfect, men were making them
freaks of impossible virtue" and "depriving them of sexuality, .... an important and
essential part of their nature.") Id. at 73. Armstrong discusses Christian preference
for virginity, see id. at 117-69, and discusses the Victorian ideal of woman as the
angel in the house, see id. at 289-92.
84. There are reports from women describing noncontracepted marital inter-
course as transcendent in language somewhat reminiscent of Finnis, George, and
Bradley. Women who are pro-life activists often regard "sex [heterosexual inter-
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The only sexual act considered potentially moral - because
noninstrumental - routinely results in male emission and or-
gasm but rarely (if that is all that occurs) in female orgasm. 86
Ironically, the only sexual act these theorists consider noninstru-
mental is also the only sexual act that routinely results not just in
male orgasm and emission but also, if the partners are fertile, in
someone else becoming pregnant and bearing his child. Such sex
seems about as instrumental as sex can be from a man's
perspective.
Given the routine instrumentality of noncontracepted heter-
osexual intercourse for men but not necessarily for women, the
experience these men describe as a selfless, transcendent union
with the other may actually be a selfish and self-centered event.
The man may experience noncontracepted heterosexual inter-
course as truly unitive, making one flesh out of two persons,
while the woman experiences boredom, discomfort, disassocia-
tion, or worse. To the extent this disjuncture does occur, hetero-
sexual intercourse is less moral than other sexual interactions.
Such sex is not only immoral in itself but also is likely to ad-
versely affect the morality of men in general, making them more
selfish because they perceive others needs and pleasures as iden-
tical to their own.
Similarly, Finnis, George, and Bradley seem to miss the
mark - at least for women - in their identification of what
makes sex alienating. They maintain that sex used to achieve
pleasure or some other (instrumental) end, can be harmful:
To treat one's own body, or the body of another, as a pleasure-
inducing machine, for example, or as a mere instrument of
procreation, is to alienate one part of the self, namely, one's
consciously experiencing (and desiring) self, from another,
namely, one's bodily self. But these parts are, in truth, meta-
physically, inseparable parts of the person as a whole. Their
existential separation in acts that instrumentalize the body for
course] as literally sacred" and transcendent because of its capacity "to bring into
existence another human life." KRISTEN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLrrIcS OF
MOTHERHOOD 165 (1984). These women often see natural planning as valuable to a
relationship because it supports and reinforces the ability of the wife to say "no" to
unwanted sex when she is sick and ensures that for at least part of every month, the
couple will express affection in nongenital ways such as holding hands. Id. at 166-67.
85. For a discussion of the inconsistency of Finnis's claims and the experiences
of committed lesbian and gay couples, see Perry, supra note 78, at 41.
86. See Alix Shulman, Organs and Orgasms, in WOMAN IN SEXIST SOCIETY:
STUDIES IN POWER AND POWERLESSNESS 292, 293-96 (Vivian Gornick and Barbara
K. Moran eds., 1971) reprinted in MARY BECKER ET AL., FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE:
TAKIN WOMEN SERIOUSLY 178 (1994).
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the sake of extrinsic goals, such as producing experiences de-
sired purely for the satisfaction of the conscious self, disinte-
grates the acting person as such.87
Women frequently describe disassociation of their conscious and
physical selves during such sex. Think of Queen Victoria's advice
to her daughter: "Lie there and think of the Empire." Women's
accounts of alienating sex (causing disassociation of conscious
and physical selves) tend not to be about seeking and achieving
their own pleasure in sexual encounters. Women describe un-
wanted sex as harmful to their sense of personal integrity.88 Such
reports are routinely made by women who have been victims of
incest, sexual abuse, and unwanted sex.89 In the next Part, I sug-
gest that we assess the morality of sex acts in terms of women's
experiences of disassociation.
III. SEXUALITY AND OBJECTIFICATION
In this Part, I propose an alternative moral standard for
judging sexual conduct that identifies sexual encounters in which
women experience disassociation of their conscious selves and
bodily selves as autonomy-denying objectification. I then apply
this standard to heterosexuality and lesbian sexuality in our cul-
ture today and conclude that male heterosexuality is more often
immoral.
A. Autonomy-Denying Objectification
In discussions of sexuality, "objectification" is a term com-
monly used but rarely defined. The literal meaning is to treat a
person as an object, in contrast to a sexual interaction which is an
expression of mutual love and respect that affirms the full per-
sonhood of each partner. Andrea Dworkin and Catharine
MacKinnon see much sexuality in our culture as male objectifica-
tion of women; what is erotic for many men and women is male
87. George & Bradley, supra note 71, at 314.
88. See generally DOROTHY ALLISON, BASTARD OUT OF CAROLINA (1993);
Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Cri-
tique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 81 (1987).
89. On survivors' experience of disassociation, see KAREN S. CALHOUN & BEV-
ERLY M. ATKINSON, TREATMENT OF RAPE VICTIMS: FACILITATING PSYCHO SOCIAL
ADJUSTMENT 1-3, 16 (1991); ELIZABETH A. WAITES, TRAUMA AND SURVIVAL:
POST-TRAUMATIC AND DISSOCIATIVE DISORDERS IN WOMEN 9-12, 26-31, 115-17,
136-38, 225-27 (1993); ELAINE WESTERLUND, WOMEN'S SEXUALITY AFTER CHILD-
HOOD INCEST 80-82, 84-85 (1992).
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dominance over and objectification of women. 90 For these femi-
nists, what is troubling is the dehumanization of one's partner -
the use of the partner's body for the subject's purposes in a way
that denies the partner's personhood. In such interactions, the
subject is indifferent to the other as a person and only interested
in figuratively consuming the desired parts of the other's body,
irrespective of the other's autonomy and subjectivity. Such ob-
jectification is autonomy-denying because the subject's actual
wishes, needs, and feelings are irrelevant. When men objectify
women in this way, they see women as their property. As own-
90. See, e.g., ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN
(1979); CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 50, 91, 173 (1987);
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 113, 115,
120, 122-24, 130-31, 137-38, 177, 178 (1989).
For a somewhat different and very rigorous discussion of many possible mean-
ings, see Martha C. Nussbaum, Objectification, 24 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 249 (1995).
Nussbaum defines objectification as generally comprised of at least seven notions:
1. Instrumentality: The objectifier treats the object as a tool of his or
her purposes.
2. Denial of autonomy: The objectifier treats the object as lacking in
autonomy and self determination.
3. Inertness: The objectifier treats the object as lacking in agency and
perhaps also in activity.
4. Fungibility: The objectifier treats the object as interchangeable (a)
with other objects of the same type, and/or (b) with objects of other
types.
5. Violability: The objectifier treats the object as lacking in boundary-
integrity, as something that is permissible to break up, smash, break
into.
6. Ownership: The objectifier treats the object as something that is
owned by another, can be bought or sold, etc.
7. Denial of subjectivity: The objectifier treats the object as something
whose experience and feelings (if any) need not be taken into
account.
Id. at 257. Instrumentality and fungibility, under Nussbaum's typology, could be
autonomy-respecting objectification using my terminology. The other forms of ob-
jectification identified by Nussbaum - denial of autonomy, inertness, violability,
ownership, and denial of subjectivity - could also be autonomy-denying objectifica-
tion. But Nussbaum does not use these terms in ways precisely parallel to my
categories.
Nussbaum discusses how complicated the notion of objectification is, and how it
has been used by Kant, MacKinnon, and Dworkin, and concludes that:
Kant, MacKinnon, and Dworkin are correct in one central insight: that
the instrumental treatment of human beings, the treatment of human
beings as tools of the purposes of another, is always morally problem-
atic; if it does not take place in a larger context of regard for humanity,
it is a central form of the morally objectionable. It is also a common
feature of sexual life, especially, though not only, in connection with
male treatment of women.
Id. at 289-90.
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ers, men have the right to do what they wish with women, ignor-
ing their physical integrity and hurting, smashing, or using them
for their own pleasure. In such encounters, men ignore women's
feelings; women are only objects, not subjects.
The key problem here is the lack of mutuality. A woman's
needs and desires are irrelevant even to her. Our culture system-
atically teaches women and men to regard women as men's sex-
ual objects and that women find erotic men's sexual
subordination of them. This view is reinforced and supported by
women's lesser economic power, the socialization of women and
men, traditional roles in heterosexual marriage, and the countless
rules and social practices disadvantaging women and limiting
their ability to say no or act autonomously in intimate relation-
ships with men.
Autonomy-denying objectification occurs when a person
agrees to have sex that she does not desire and expects no plea-
sure from, though she may say yes and even pretend to have an
orgasm. 91 Such sex is autonomy-denying because she would
rather avoid it than experience it were there no unwanted conse-
quences.92 In any relationship there will be times when one part-
ner wants sex and the other is not equally interested but is quite
willing to participate and enjoys the experience. This is not what
I am referring to. In addition, the degree of harm is likely to vary
with frequency. Occasional autonomy-denying sex may cause
only trivial or fleeting harm, whereas repeated and routine au-
tonomy-denying sex is likely to cause more severe harm.
Avoiding undesired sex, even if consensual, is important be-
cause repeated unwanted sex can cause serious harm to women's
sense of self and integrity. In a recent essay, Robin West identi-
fied four injuries to women's sense of selfhood when they allow
91. For a further description of women's experience of unwanted sex in hetero-
sexual relationships, see, for example, Liz Kelly, The Continuum of Sexual Violence,
in WOMEN, VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL CONTROL 46, 56 (Jalna Hanmer & Mary May-
nard eds., 1987) (finding that most women "felt pressured to have sex in many, if not
all, of their sexual relationships with men").
92. I use "autonomy" in an unusual way. I am not describing consensual acts as
necessarily autonomous, nor suggesting that autonomy is synonymous with choice.
"Autonomy," as used here, does not have its ordinary liberal meaning. Indeed, it is
inconsistent with standard usage to the extent that I exclude consensual unwanted
sex from the realm of autonomous sexual experiences. I considered changing the
term to "authentic" but ultimately rejected the term as too weak to carry strong
normative claims. I hope to change the meaning of autoiomy in the end by describ-
ing it realistically as a matter of degree and dependent on the justice of alternatives
rather than as some inherent aspect of human personality.
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their bodies to be used in autonomy-denying but consensual sex:
(1) injury to their capacity for self-assertion and to their ability to
translate their feelings and experiences into actions to increase
their pleasure or decrease their pain; (2) injury to their sense of
themselves as sexual subjects by serving others' needs and wants
rather than seeing themselves as beings with their own legitimate
needs and wants; (3) injury to their sense of autonomy; and (4)
injury to their sense of integrity when they lie and say that they
desired and enjoyed the experience. 93 Women's sense of integ-
rity is violated when women disassociate their conscious selves
from their physical selves to distance themselves from a sexual
experience they do not desire. Thus, unwanted sex injures wo-
men's autonomy, integrity, and sense of being agents and sexual
subjects.
It is true that we typically lack perfect autonomy. We often
do things that we would not do were there no negative conse-
quences, such as work for wages for an obnoxious boss we must
pretend to like. There are, however, likely to be differences be-
tween allowing one's body to be used sexually in undesired and
unwanted ways and other instances of less than perfect auton-
omy, particularly for women in a culture that regards men's sex-
ual use of women as demeaning and degrading to women but not
93. See Robin West, The Harms of Consensual Sex, 94 AM. PHIL. Ass'N NEWS-
LETTERs 52, 53 (1995).
First, they may sustain injuries to their capacities for self-assertion: the
"psychic connection," so to speak, between pleasure, desire, motiva-
tion, and action is weakened or severed. Acting on the basis of our
own felt pleasures and pains is an important component of forging our
own way in the world - of "asserting" our "selves." Consenting to
unpleasurable sex - acting in spite of displeasure - threatens that
means of self-assertion. Second, women who consent to undesired sex
may injure their sense of self-possession. When we consent to unde-
sired penetration of our physical bodies we have in a quite literal way
constituted ourselves as what I have elsewhere called "giving selves"
- selves who cannot be violated, because they have been defined as
(and define themselves as ) being "for others." Our bodies to that
extent no longer belong to ourselves. Third, when women consent to
undesired and unpleasurable sex because of their felt or actual depen-
dency upon a partner's affection or economic status, they injure their
sense of autonomy: they have thereby neglected to take whatever
steps would be requisite to achieving the self-sustenance necessary to
their independence. And fourth, to the extent that these un-
pleasurable and undesired sexual acts are followed by contrary to fact
claims that they enjoyed the whole thing - what might be called "he-
donic lies" - women who engage in them do considerable damage to
their sense of integrity.
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to men. The damage unwanted sex causes to women - to their
autonomy, integrity, and sense of being agents and sexual sub-
jects - is not just another set of alienating experiences like
working on an assembly line. One cannot simply decide when to
disassociate one's bodily experience from one's conscious self
and when to integrate them. Unwanted sex and the related phe-
nomenon of disassociation undermine and ultimately destroy wo-
men's potential to develop their sexuality as something of their
own rather than something fashioned to please men. In a culture
in which men's use of women's bodies is regarded as demeaning
and evidence of women's essential inferiority, unwanted sex also
teaches women that they exist to serve others.
I do not propose any direct prohibition on consent to auton-
omy-denying sex for any woman, whether wife, girlfriend, or sex
worker. My argument is that we need to increase the odds of
women being able to develop as sexual subjects should they so
choose.
Thus far, I have discussed autonomy-denying objectification,
the kind described by MacKinnon and Dworkin, though I have
defined it in a way they have not. As I use the term, autonomy-
denying objectification includes all sex or sexual experiences one
would rather avoid than endure could one do so without negative
consequences. This category includes sexual torture, rape, and
sexual harassment at work, 94 school, or on the street. 95
Now imagine objectification that is consistent with the au-
tonomy of the subject - I call this autonomy-respecting objecti-
fication. This objectification occurs when a person treats another
as an object in a manner consistent with the object's own wishes
and desires. Such objectification can take a number of forms.
For example, autonomy-respecting objectification occurs when
the subject sees the other as body parts for the subject's use be-
cause the object's desires are consistent with the subject's own, as
in a brief sexual encounter between strangers. As a collection of
useful body parts, the other might be fungible with similar ob-
jects, though the two meet with a common goal. Similarly, con-
trolled, consensual sadomasochism ("S/M") can be objectifying
because the script requires certain roles and forms of interaction
94. See Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, 49
STAN. L. REv. 691 (1997).
95. See Cynthia Grant Bowman, Street Harassment and the Informal Ghettoiza-
tion of Women, 106 HARV. L. REV. 517 (1993) (discussing effects of street
harassment).
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based on those roles. Such interaction is objectifying in that one
actor treats the other not as the actual human being she is but as
a mental abstraction, a fantasy, a role. Such sex may, of course,
be mutually desired, consistent with and respectful of the auton-
omy of each.
In contrast to both forms of objectifying sex - autonomy-
denying and autonomy-respecting - nonobjectifying sex is both
mutually desired and entirely consistent with the personhood of
the partner, affirming the partner as a person rather than only as
a thing. At the same time, however, nonobjectifying sex is not a
platonic love of pure spirits, but love between two embodied be-
ings. One can appreciate another's body without reducing that
person to their body and denying their personhood. Indeed,
one's love for another person is likely to heighten one's apprecia-
tion for the real physical beauty of the beloved's body.
Examples of sexual interactions in each of these three cate-
gories include the following: (1) autonomy-denying sex includes
nonconsensual sex (rape and sexual torture), consensual un-
wanted sex (sex one would rather forego than endure were there
no negative consequences), sexual harassment on the job and at
school, and virtually all commercial sex;96 (2) autonomy-respect-
ing, objectifying sex includes mutually desired sex between stran-
gers or between individuals who regard their sexual partner as
fungible with other possible partners and hence an "object" in
some sense, and sex dictated by scripts, such as S/M. Nonobjecti-
fying sex is mutually desired sex between two individuals who
interact as unique individuals and affirm each other's
personhood.
The lines between these categories are blurred at best. Rape
and sexual torture are at one end of a continuum and nonobjecti-
fying mutually desired sex at the other. Even the participants
may not always know which category applies in a given situation.
Women often constitute themselves as "giving selves," agreeing
to give what might otherwise be taken from them and hence hid-
ing, often from themselves and more often from their partners,
whether sex is something they want.97 Women routinely submit
to sex they know they do not want and also pretend they desire
the experience. The point here is not to assign blame. Indeed,
one partner may experience unwanted sex even though the other
96. Virtually all prostitution, phone sex, nude dancing, etc., appears to be is
unwanted sexual activity by this definition, since these workers require payment.
97. See West, supra note 88.
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partner has been blameless. For example, despite her lover's
best intentions, autonomy-denying sex can occur if a woman
shuts down sexually because of past experiences of violence and
abuse. In that situation, autonomy-denying sex is likely to occur
unless she lets her partner know about her difficulty so that the
partner can stop until she again desires sexual interaction.
B. Autonomy-Denying Objectification of Women in
Heterosexual and Lesbian Relationships
Although autonomy-denying objectification is harmful to
women, it does not follow that direct regulation should criminal-
ize such expressions of sexuality. Women consent to much au-
tonomy-denying sex because, often rightly, they see enduring it
as a better option than the alternatives. We can, however, at-
tempt to minimize the social, cultural, and economic forces pres-
suring women into autonomy-denying sex.
In this Subpart, I consider the degree of autonomy-denying
objectifying sex in relationships of sexual intimacy available to
women - heterosexual and lesbian relationships. Men, whether
gay or straight, seem more likely to objectify than women: men
consume far more photographic pornography,98 are more inter-
ested in promiscuous sex,99 and more concerned with looks. 100
In a study of cohabiting heterosexual couples, gay couples, and
lesbian couples, researchers found that "[f]or all kinds of couples,
except lesbians, people who find their partners attractive say they
have a better sex life" and are "happier in their overall
relationship." 101
98. See EDWARD 0. LAUMANN ET AL., THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXU-
ALITY: SEXUAL PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES 135 (1994) (in a National Opin-
ion Research Center ("NORC") survey of a nationally representative sample of men
and women, 23% of men and 11% of women report viewing X-rated movies or
videos; 16% of men and 4% of women report using sexually explicit books or
magazines).
99. See id. at 198 (NORC's survey found that 49.7% of men report having 5 or
more sexual partners while only 12.1% of women report the same number of sexual
partners).
100. See PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES:
MONEY, WORK, SEX 247 (1983).
101. Id. These findings are especially interesting in light of the fact that lesbians
placed about the same value on looks as married women: 41% of lesbians stressed
looks, with 6% regarding "movie star" looks as important and 35% regarding sexy
looking as important. Similarly, 40% of wives placed equal stress on looks, with 9%
regarding "movie star" looks as important and 31% regarding sexy looking as im-
portant. But 73% of husbands considered it important that their partner be either
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Autonomy-denying sex is overwhelmingly asserted by men
in the United States today. Rape is the clearest evidence, and it
is overwhelmingly men who rape women. In a recent National
Opinion Research Center ("NORC") sex survey, the authors re-
port that whereas 21.6% of women report having been forced to
do something sexual by a man, 0.3% report having been forced
by a woman; in contrast 1.3% of men report being forced by a
woman. 102 Taboos on sex between women may result in more
underreporting of sex forced by another woman than by a man,
but 13% of women respondents in this survey did report some
lesbian sexual behavior after age 18.103 Yet only 0.3% report
having been forced to do something sexual by a woman. This
data indicates that although coercive sex between women does
occur, the rates are quite low relative to man-on-woman rape.
The more common form of autonomy-denying objectifica-
tion - unwanted sex - is also more prevalent among women in
heterosexual relationships. Girls continue to be socialized to be
sexual objects rather than agents seeking their own sexual plea-
sure. In a study on teenage girls' sexuality based on hundreds of
interviews, the author reports that girls have heterosexual inter-
course for all sorts of reasons: to get him to love her; for a hug or
some physical closeness; to be popular; to prove her worth; or to
have the experience of sex before going to college. 10 4 This study
reports that most girls do not, however, have heterosexual inter-
"movie star" good looking (16% of husbands) or at least sexy looking (57% of
husbands).
102. See LAUMANN ET AL., supra note 98, at 336.
103. Id. at 299. The NORC survey reported on responses of a random sample.
Studies of domestic violence within lesbian and gay relationships are just beginning
to appear and seem to suggest that within lesbian and gay relationships violence
levels may be as high as within heterosexual relationships. See THE NATIONAL COA-
LITION OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, 1997 REPORT ON LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL,
TRANSGENDER DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (1997) (on file with author); Gregory S. Mer-
ril, Battered Gay Men: An Exploration of Abuse, Help-Seeking, and Why They Stay
(1996) (unpublished M.S.W. thesis, San Francisco State University) (on file with au-
thor). These results seem at odds with those of the NORC survey, however, and are
not based on randomized nationally representative sampling techniques. Also, as of
yet, there are no studies comparing clearly-defined, specific kinds of abuse - psy-
chological, rape, sexual torture - across groups. It may be that abuse rates in gen-
eral in intimate relationships are similar among those involved in heterosexual,
lesbian, and gay relationships, but that there are variations in patterns of specific
kinds of abuse. In any event, my argument does not focus on domestic violence but
on other domestic inequities.
104. See SHARON THOMPSON, GOING ALL THE WAY: TEENAGE GIRLS' TALES
OF SEX, ROMANCE, AND PREGNANCY 97-98 (1995).
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course for their own sexual pleasure. 10 5 Few mentioned having
orgasms as a result of heterosexual intercourse. Only girls in-
volved in relationships with other girls mentioned orgasms or
their own sexual pleasure as relevant to their decision to "have
sex.' '106 It is, of course, likely that at least some teenage girls in
heterosexual relationships have orgasms and are motivated by
their own desire for pleasure, but this study indicates that many
have other motivations and that few feel free to describe them-
selves as sexual subjects. 10 7
Many women in heterosexual relationships speak of having
unwanted sex because they feel it is their obligation or duty, they
wish to avoid a partner's anger or resentment, they feel saying no
is awkward or difficult, or they want to cuddle or hug and engage
in genital sex to get affection. The phenomenon of unwanted sex
does not seem as widespread among lesbians, 10 8 though there is
bound to be some, particularly when economic and other power
differentials are present. But there are a number of reasons to
think that unwanted sex is likely to occur less often in lesbian
than heterosexual relationships.
First, both partners in a lesbian relationship are likely to
value nongenital touching and cuddling as an ends in themselves
and are less likely than men to assume that any physical contact
is an attempt to initiate genital sex.109 Second, neither partner
comes to a lesbian relationship with the understanding that be-
cause she, and only she has a penis, sex is defined by and cen-
tered on her orgasms; neither partner has been raised with a
male sense of entitlement to sex from "his" woman. 110 Because
105. Id. at 104.
106. Id. at 184.
107. Id. at 104.
108. In my research, no sexual survey asks people about their experience of un-
wanted sex. There are, however, many anecdotal reports of unwanted sex by heter-
osexual women. See, e.g., LILLIAN B. RUBIN, WORLDS OF PAIN: LFE IN THE
WORKING-CLASS FAMILY 148-53 (1976). Although one can easily find lesbians talk-
ing about sex and sexual problems, they do not report unwanted sex. See, e.g., Mar-
garet Nichols, Lesbian Relationships: Implications for the Study of Sexuality and
Gender, in HOMOSEXUALITY/HETEROSEXUALITY 350 (David P. McWhirter et al.
eds., 1990) [hereinafter Nichols, Lesbian Relationships]; Margaret Nichols, Lesbian
Sexuality: Issues and Developing Theory, in LESBIAN PSYCHOLOGIES 103 (Boston
Lesbian Psychologies Collective eds., 1987) [hereinafter Nichols, Lesbian Sexuality]
(reporting that lesbians are less likely to pressure a reluctant partner to have sex).
109. See BLUMSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 100, at 197.
110. In one study, describing a lesbian couple in which one partner desired more
genital sex than the other, Sally, the person who wanted more sex, describes how she
initiates sex. She states "now I'm more discreet. I edit how much I ask in order not
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both are women, one does not have the disadvantage vis-a-vis
the other of thinking that her sexuality is primarily for the plea-
sure of her (male) partner rather than herself, a lesson drummed
continuously into women by our culture. Nor is the partner who
sees sex as an entitlement as likely as a man to have the advan-
tages of being older and earning a male wage, while the other
partner has the disadvantages of being younger and of being ex-
pected to care for the home, her partner, and the children in ad-
dition to working for wages.
Dominance can be based on any number of other factors
less likely to systematically favor men, such as physical endow-
ments, beauty, or willingness to leave the relationship if one does
not get one's way. However, in heterosexual relationships, there
are more power differentials systematically favoring one partner
than there are in lesbian relationships. And many more lesbians
than heterosexual men are feminists fiercely committed to equal-
ity in sex.I1 l
I am not suggesting that lesbian couples never have un-
wanted sex, that rape and coercion never occur between lesbians,
or that all heterosexual sex is immoral. I am only stating that the
available data indicates that rape, sexual coercion, and unwanted
sex are relatively more widespread among heterosexual couples
than lesbian couples. The differences between lesbian and heter-
osexual couples are of degree and linked to many cultural fac-
tors. These differences are not essential or eternal. Indeed, the
extent of objectification and role playing" 2 in lesbian relation-
ships has varied over time and in various communities. During
the eighties and nineties, there has been a significant increase in
objectification in relationships between women in some settings:
increased stress on looks and weight; increased role playing with
"butch" and "femme" defined in ways that seem heterosexual;
women encouraging women to enjoy promiscuity, dominance
to get rejected as much. Also, she sometimes says no, but more often than not she
says yes. But then I don't ask all the time." Id. at 214. The authors conclude: "if
Sally were a traditional heterosexual man, she would not hesitate to ask, because it
would be both her right and her duty to do so. Nor would she be so hurt when
refused." Id. at 214-15. The problem more likely to be raised by lesbians is not
unwanted sex but "bed death," i.e., too little sex once the relationship is no longer
novel. See Nichols, Lesbian Sexuality, supra note 108, at 103.
111. See BLUMSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 100, at 55, 237-38, 239-40, 303.
112. By role playing I mean behavior patterned after male-female relationships.
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and submission in sex, including S/M;1 13 and women encouraging
lesbians to have sex with men because such sex "transgresses"
current understandings. 114
The increase in objectification in lesbian relationships is it-
self a cultural phenomenon associated with the virtual elimina-
tion of lesbian feminism from the gay and lesbian scene during
the eighties and nineties and its replacement with a supposedly
more radical queer politics. 115 Lesbian feminism of the seventies
was critical of heterosexuality because of its routine sexual objec-
tification and subordination of women in heterosexual relation-
ships. With the emergence of queer politics in the eighties, that
critique disappeared. 116 In the queer movement, the radical les-
bian feminist critique of heterosexuality has been replaced by a
liberal claim that all sexual minorities are entitled to equal treat-
ment in existing social and legal institutions and structures."17
I cited increased butch-femme role playing among lesbians
as evidence of increased objectification. 118 Butch and femme are
not, however, equivalent to heterosexual roles, particularly in
bed. Butch-femme roles were most clearly delineated in the fif-
ties in many lesbian communities. 1 9 The butch role in sex con-
sisted of being the active partner giving sexual pleasure to the
femme. Indeed, many butches could not bear to be touched or to
113. See PAT CALIFIA, SENSUOUS MAGIC: A GUIDE FOR ADVENTUROUS LOVERS
(1998); PAT CALIFIA, SEX CHANGES: THE POLITICS OF TRANSGENDERISM (1997).
114. See, e.g., Sue Wilkenson, Bisexuality as Backlash, in ALL THE RAGE: REAS-
SERTING RADICAL LESBIAN FEMINISM 75, 86-87 (Lynne Harne & Elaine Miller eds.,
1996) [hereinafter ALL THE RAGE] (describing this phenomena).
115. See, e.g., id. (concluding that "[wihether presenting sex with men as 'trans-
gressive' for lesbians or sex with women as 'chic' for heterosexual women, the mar-
keting of bisexuality as fashion functions primarily to depoliticise sex").
116. See generally Shiela Jeffreys, The Essential Lesbian, in ALL THE RAGE,
supra note 114, at 90; Wilkenson, supra note 114, at 75.
117. See, e.g., Katie Cotter, Dating a Man: A Lesbian Leader Reveals She's Been
Doing the One Thing Her Followers Won't Stand For, ADVOCATE, Feb. 18, 1997, at
41 (describing JoAnn Loulan's new heterosexual romance). "Longtime lesbian ac-
tivist" and "innovative political thinker" Robin Tyler is quoted as stating: "'The gay
community has to stop saying we are talking about sexual politics. We're not. We're
not a movement from the waist down. What we're fighting for is the right to love,'
... lesbians should therefore defend Loulan's right to love a man." Id. at 42.
118. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
119. -Often, there was misogyny in the distinction between femme and butch: the
butch was braver because more visible as a lesbian (more "out") and more mascu-
line in a society that prized masculinity over femininity. In many places, a femme
could not dance with another woman without her butch's permission; the butch held
open the door and lit cigarettes. See generally ELIZABETH KENNEDY & MADELINE
DAVIS, BOOTS OF LEATHER, SLIPPERS OF GOLD (1993).
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be the direct recipient of sexual pleasure. 20 This is hardly paral-
lel to male-female roles in heterosexual encounters, where the
core of sex is male pleasure and orgasm, typically by means (fel-
latio or heterosexual intercourse) that are unlikely to result in
female orgasm.
In heterosexual relationships, women and men continue to
perform tasks according to gender roles. Women tend to be pri-
marily responsible for child care, shopping, cooking, cleaning,
and other household tasks, while husbands tend to be older, re-
sponsible for garbage, garage, car maintenance, and yard
work.' 2' Husbands are also likely to be regarded as primarily
responsible for earning money. While there is more variation to-
day than there would have been in the past, gender roles among
men and women in heterosexual relationships remain prominent.
Within lesbian couples roles are less clearly defined. One
partner may appear to be more butch (shorter hair, less jewelry,
less feminine style) and the other more femme, but they are un-
likely to divide tasks and responsibilities predictably. The butch
partner may, for example, earn less money, cook most meals, and
be younger. There are no patterns.122
In sum, I have assessed the morality of sexual relationships
in terms of their tendency to objectify the "other" in autonomy-
denying ways. Using this standard, heterosexual relationships
are more problematic for women than lesbian relationships. The
problem is not that heterosexuals objectify each other; rather it is
that women as well as men in heterosexual relationships tend to
view women as men's sexual objects instead of as sexual subjects
in their own right. Autonomy-denying objectification contributes
to women's subordinate status, perpetuating an additional moral
wrong. As I discuss in the next Part, the compulsory nature of
heterosexuality means that most women are unaware that they
might find moral and equitable intimacy in lesbian relationships.
120. See LESLIE FEINBERG, STONE BUTCH BLUES (1993) (describing such a per-
son as "stone butch").
121. See, e.g., ARLIE HOCHSCHILD & ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT:
WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME 6-10 (1989).
122. In the American Couples study of married, cohabiting heterosexual, gay,
and lesbian couples, researchers found no correlation for same-sex couples between
masculinity or femininity and which partner did more housework. See BLUMSTEIN
& SCHWARTZ, supra note 100, at 148. In a recent nonrepresentative survey of lesbi-
ans by the Advocate, the only behavior the survey found correlated to butch-femme
self-identification was who drives the car. See Janet Lever, Lesbian Sex Survey, AD-
VOCATE, Aug. 22, 1995, at 23, 28.
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IV. TABOOS ON LESBIAN RELATIONSHIPS AND IMMORALITY
IN HETEROSEXUAL RELATIONSHIPS
Taboos on lesbian relationships facilitate immoral heterosex-
ual relationships, just as nineteenth-century "moral" norms facili-
tated the immorality of slavery and women's subordination to
men. Most heterosexual relationships continue to be relation-
ships of injustice and inequality, and I begin this Part by briefly
describing some of the continuing problems outside the sexual
realm. 123 These continuing inequities should, like unwanted sex,
be recognized as moral problems. As Susan Moller Okin pointed
out in Justice, Gender, and the Family, our understandings of mo-
rality begin at home, and we cannot expect to raise moral citizens
in families in which the benefits and burdens of family life are
inequitably divided between wife and husband.1 24
Eliminating taboos on lesbian relationships could have a
considerable effect on women's immoral subordination (sexual
and otherwise) in heterosexual relationships even if most women
are born with a fixed sexual orientation towards men. As Ad-
rienne Rich noted, men worry not about being smothered by wo-
men but "that women could be indifferent to them altogether,
that men could be allowed sexual and emotional - therefore
economic - access to women only on women's terms, otherwise
being left on the periphery of the matrix. '' 125 To the extent more
equitable lesbian relationships are socially acceptable, men might
strike fairer bargains with women in heterosexual relation-
ships.126 This effect will be even more dramatic if, as I suggest in
the discussion below, many women are born with a fluid sexual-
ity so that significant numbers of women would be interested in
lesbian relationships were such relationships seen as normal and
socially acceptable.
A. Inequalities in Heterosexual Relationships
In this Subpart, I describe only briefly a few areas of persis-
tent inequality in heterosexual relationships. Were injustice and
immorality in heterosexual relationships limited to the sexual
123. See supra notes 98-111 and accompanying text.
124. See SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 17-24
(1989).
125. Rich, supra note 23, at 643.
126. On inequality with respect to sex in lesbian or heterosexual relationships,
see supra notes 98-122 and accompanying text. For a discussion of inequalities in
other areas, see infra notes 127-46 and accompanying text.
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arena, I would simply rely on the discussion above of autonomy-
denying sex in heterosexual relationships. But there are many
areas of persistent inequality.
Married women are more likely to be depressed than mar-
ried men or unmarried women. 127 Although women are the
caretakers and nurturers of many people in their lives - chil-
dren, coworkers, husbands, bosses, and elderly relatives - many
women receive little nurturing or emotional support themselves
from their emotionally distant spouses.'2 8 Women in heterosex-
ual relationships continue to be primarily responsible for child
care, child care arrangements, and domestic caretaking in addi-
tion to working for wages. Although many women want to be
the primary caretaker of their children, 2 9 being a caretaker does
not mandate inequality in terms of leisure time, power in a rela-
tionship, economic security, or sexual fulfillment. And most wo-
men are not satisfied with the current division of labor.' 30
Inequities arise from many factors, including socialization
into traditional sex roles and legal rules governing division of as-
sets and responsibility at divorce. Inequities also stem from wo-
men's greater commitment to marriage and children. In most
marriages, the wife's greater commitment to the children weak-
ens her in a number of ways. Once she is the primary caretaker
of the children, her attachment to the wage labor market is likely
to be more attenuated than his.' 3 ' She is now likely to earn
much less money than he does or to be entirely dependent on his
support. If she pushes too much, then he may insist on a di-
vorce. 132 In a divorce, she may fear losing custody of the chil-
127. See Hope Landrine, Depression and Stereotypes of Women: Preliminary Em-
pirical Analyses of the Gender-Role Hypothesis, 19 SEX ROLES 527, 528 (1988) cited
in BECKER ET AL., supra note 86, at 498-99.
128. For a discussion of the norm that men are "emotionally inexpressive" except
for the expression of "emotions that enhance men's control and status," see ALLAN
G. JOHNSON, THE GENDER KNOT: UNRAVELING OUR PATRIARCHAL LEGACY, 64-65
(1997).
129. See Louis GENEVIE & EVA MARGOLIES, THE MOTHERHOOD REPORT:
How WOMEN FEEL ABOUT BEING MOTHERS 358-59 (1987) (reporting that "only
about one in four [mothers, whether working for wages or full-time homemakers]
thought fathers should play a fifty-fifty role in raising the children.").
130. Women report that "the uneven division of labor was becoming a source of
conflict between men and women." ROBERTA S. SIGEL, AMBITION & ACCOMMODA-
TION: How WOMEN VIEW GENDER RELATIONS 143, 167 (1996).
131. See VICTOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EOUALITY 60-61
(1988) (arguing that women's greater commitment to children is central to their per-
sistent economic inequality).
132. See HOCHSCHILD & MACHUNG, supra note 121, at 253.
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dren despite having been the primary caretaker (and may worry
that she will have fewer assets to use in fighting for their custody
because she has been the primary caretaker). 33 After a divorce,
if she does retain custody, then she and the children are likely to
be poorer than they were prior to the divorce.134 Most custodial
wives and their children do not regain their predivorce standard
of living unless the mother is able to marry another man.135 Re-
marriage becomes more difficult, however, as a woman ages and
is less likely for women with custody of children.
In contrast, men do not suffer the same drop in economic
well-being after a divorce. 136 In fact, the income available for
their personal needs and desires increases. 137 Furthermore, it is
easier for men to remarry because they are less likely to have
custody of the children, they earn more money than women, and
women are more willing to marry older men than men are willing
to marry older women.
Many readers will feel that this analysis is harsh and unfair
to many wonderful men and that I am "essentializing" the differ-
ences between women and men. True, there have been changes
for the better. But studies reveal that husbands of working wives
have only marginally increased the amount of effort they expend
on child care and domestic tasks.138
Moreover, even though some men voice commitment to
equality between the sexes, the vast majority of men in hetero-
sexual relationships resist equality in their own intimate relation-
ships (and do not insist on it at work either). A study of men and
women reveals that men are generally aware of women's distress
over continuing gender inequities but "consider it a fact of life
which does not engage their interest, let alone their commit-
ment.' 39 In the all-male or all-female focus groups in this study,
133. See Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S.
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 133 (1992).
134. See Karen C. Holden & Pamela J. Smock, The Economic Costs of Marital
Dissolution: Why Do Women Bear a Disproportionate Cost?, 17 ANN. REV. Soc. 52
(1991).
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See HOCHSCHILD & MACHUNG, supra note 121, at 2-10.
139. SIGEL, supra note 130, at 143 (studying women and men in New Jersey). See
also HOCHSCHILD & MACHUNG, supra note 121, at 9. In a study of couples in the
San Francisco Bay area with two working parents and a child or children under six,
Hochschild and Machung found little ideological commitment to equality between
the sexes in working-class families but more real equality than in the more upscale
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the moderator began by discussing some neutral topic. In the all-
female groups, the moderator never had to raise the topic of gen-
der relations; "it arose spontaneously.' 140 In the male groups,
"the moderator was always the one to bring it up; nor did men
show much inclination to linger over this topic.' 14' One of the
women's major complaints was the "inequitable division of labor
in the household.' 1 42 For most men in the focus groups, "the
second shift [was] a nonproblem.' 43 Although the female focus
groups noted that "the uneven division-of-labor [at home] was
becoming a source of conflict between men and women," the
male focus groups failed "to discuss the topic at even moderate
length."144
Women are more committed to domestic equality in inti-
mate relationships than are men. In a study of heterosexual mar-
ried, heterosexual cohabiting, gay, and lesbian couples in the
eighties, only in lesbian couples was there no correlation between
income and power in the relationship. 45 Lesbian couples are
also more likely to share domestic tasks equitably than are
heterosexual couples. 146
families. In the middle and upper class families, there was an overt commitment to
equality in domestic responsibilities, but often that was interpreted as his being re-
sponsible for (for example) the garage and the dog while she was responsible for
everything else. Men routinely came home and rested or engaged in hobbies while
their wives worked the second shift. Hochschild and Machung found that, on aver-
age, the women in the families she studied worked an extra month a year. Id. at 5.
140. SIGEL, supra note 130, at 38.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 167.
143. Id.
144. Id. Male telephone respondents were asked more specific questions.
Although over two-thirds of the men surveyed believed that domestic labor should
be evenly divided when both parents worked, only fourteen percent of the men
thought that equal sharing actually takes place. Id. at 168.
145. See BLUMSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 100, at 53-77 ("[w]e find that the
amount of money a person earns - in comparison with a partner's income - estab-
lishes relative power" among all couples but lesbians.) Id. at 53.
146. See id. at 149 ("Lesbians are especially careful to devise equitable organiza-
tion of household duties."). Cf "When husbands do a lot of housework, married
couples have greater conflict." Id. at 147. Although cohabiting women "do less
housework than working wives," their male partners are "no more involved with
household duties than husbands." Id. ("Both heterosexual and homosexual men
feel that a successful partner should not have to do housework."). Id. at 151. See
also Patterson, Families, supra note 52, at 119-20 (finding that lesbian couples gener-
ally share household tasks and family decision making equally, but biological
mothers tend to have greater involvement in the care of their child while her lesbian
partner spends more time in paid employment. However, these differences are
much less pronounced than those between husbands and wives in heterosexual
families.).
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My point is not that individual men are jerks, insensitive to
the needs and desires of their partners and consciously exploiting
their partners' sexual, emotional, reproductive, and domestic la-
bor. Rather, the point is that individual men can be kind and
loving to their wives and still enjoy more than their share of the
benefits of family life. I am not suggesting that it is impossible
for a woman to have an equitable relationship with a man, but it
is difficult and not the norm.
B. The Fluidity of (Some) Women's Sexuality
In the introduction to this Part, I suggested that even if most
women are born with a fixed heterosexual orientation, eliminat-
ing taboos on lesbian relationships will nevertheless create pres-
sure on men to make heterosexual relationships fairer and more
equal.147 On the other hand, if many women are born with a
more fluid sexuality so that many might be interested in lesbian
relationships but for current taboos, then eliminating these
taboos will place even greater pressure on heterosexual men to
behave fairly. One fascinating study reports that women's (and
men's) perceptions of equality within a heterosexual relationship
varied with the perceived likelihood of finding another partner
who was as good or better than the present partner. Thus, a wo-
man's perception of equality in her relationship with her husband
or boyfriend often indicates the lack of better alternatives for
intimacy.148
We learn from our culture that the key determinant of sex-
ual orientation is whether the subject and object have the same
or different physical sex. I learned that: (1) everyone has a sex-
ual orientation, i.e., a desire for sexual objects who are physically
male or female; (2) if one finds any pleasure in making love to a
person of the opposite sex then one is "normal" and heterosexual
unless one also has an overwhelming taste for a lover whose
physical sex is like one's own, in which case one is a bisexual; and
(3) normal people would find making love to a person of the
same sex physically revolting. 149 Women who feel "normal" are
147. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
148. See generally Elizabeth Grauerholtz, Balancing the Power in Dating Rela-
tionships, 17 SEX ROLES 563 (1987).
149. See, e.g., John C. Gonsiorek & James D. Weinrich, The Definition and Scope
of Sexual Orientation, in HOMOSEXUALITY: RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC
POLICY 1 (John C. Gonsiorek & James D. Weinrich eds., 1991). Gonsiorek and
Weinrich distinguish between biological sex, gender identity, social sex role, and sex-
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likely to assume that they are heterosexuals who desire objects
whose bodies are physically male, and are likely to be confirmed
in this understanding if they find their initial heterosexual exper-
iences at all arousing.
These assumptions make no sense to me and, I suspect, to at
least some other women. 150 Whether one desires intimacy with
women, men, or both, has little or nothing to do with desire for
sex with individuals whose bodies have a certain physical sex. 151
Many women report finding more of what they want or need in
relationships with women:
[Tihere's nothing I am not getting in [my] relationship with a
woman that I think I could get with a man. Whereas when I
think of being with a man, I think there's so much I couldn't
get. I can't imagine where a man would come from who would
be someone I could have this kind of relationship with. 152
As this suggests, for some women, the physical sex of a partner's
body is not critically important, though sex may be. Far more
ual orientation. "[S]exual orientation is erotic and/or affectional disposition to the
same and/or opposite sex." Id.
150. See, e.g., LINDSY VAN GELDER & PAMELA ROBIN BRANDT, THE GIRLS
NEXT DOOR: INTO THE HEART OF LESBIAN AMERICA 105 (1996).
The circuitous route to a lesbian identity is complicated by female sex-
ual fluidity; girls and women who are attracted to both genders may
genuinely not feel like "lesbians." But we've met hardly any gay wo-
man who had an easy time putting a label on the constellation of sex-
ual, emotional, and political feelings that add up to a lesbian identity.
Gay males appear to be more resourceful at recognizing same-sex at-
traction at a young age - probably because an erection is a pretty
unmistakable clue that what's going on is sexual. Female sexual re-
sponse is more subtle, more diffuse, and more open to interpretation.
Girls are also more programmed than boys to think of their worth in
terms of the opposite gender and to imagine their futures in terms of
marriage and children. When they begin to grapple with lesbian feel-
ings, there's an extra layer of previously formed identity to strip off.
Id.
151. In a recent essay, Eridami writes that "women, compared to men, tend not
to have sexual orientations." ERIDAMI, IS SEXUAL ORIENTATION A SECONDARY
SEX CHARACTERISTIC, CLOSER TO HOME: BISEXUALITY & FEMINISM 173 (1992).
This is close to my point, though Eridami does not explain what precisely she means.
See MARJORIE GARBER, VICE VERSA: BISEXUALITY AND THE EROTICISM OF EVE-
RYDAY LIFE 249-50, 278 (1995). Garber makes similar points in her newest book as
she argues that the current categories of homosexuality, bisexuality, and heterosexu-
ality are artificial and often wildly inapplicable to the lives of real or fictional indi-
viduals. But Garber's point seems to be that everyone would recognize their
bisexuality were it not for social pressures and norms, i.e., were social norms and
taboos different, everyone would realize their own desire for lovers with male bodies
and lovers with female bodies.
152. VAN GELDER & BRANDT, supra note 150, at 121.
1998] WOMEN AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION 209
important are qualities we associate with gender, such as the
partner's ability to be emotionally supportive and intimate. 153
My point is not that sexual orientation is socially constructed
rather than innate or biologically based. My point is that sexual
orientation as normally understood - referring to whether the
objects of one's desires have the physical sex of men or women
- is simply not pointing at anything relevant for many wo-
men.154 For many women, whether a partner has the same or
different physical sex is irrelevant to sexual pleasure, desire, and
preferences. A partner's physical sex is simply not important in-
dependent of the relationship of care and connection in which it
is encountered, in part because our sexuality is not organized
around physical objects but around the quality of and emotional
intimacy in a personal relationship.155
I feel that I have no sexual orientation as that term is ordi-
narily used. I have identified as and acted like a heterosexual. I
do not think that I was really a repressed lesbian or bisexual. I
was an ordinary heterosexual. Given what I was taught about
sexual orientation - the three factors described at the beginning
of this Subpart - it never occurred to me that I could be any-
thing else until I was in my forties. Today, I identify as and act
like a lesbian. All of these categories seem wildly artificial, inap-
propriate, and irrelevant. A lover's physical maleness or female-
ness has never been of central importance to me, let alone of
critical importance - that has stayed the same.
It might seem that the category of bisexual includes people
with no sexual orientation. But people without a sexual orienta-
153. See, e.g., id. (reporting that "[a]ccording to Good Housekeeping, most mar-
ried couples spend a total of four minutes a day in meaningful conversation.").
154. In suggesting that a partner's physical sex is not of critical importance for
some women, I do not mean to imply that physical sexual-intimacy is less important
for such people, nor less orgasmic. I simply mean ihat whether one's partner's body
is physically male or female is less important for some women than current discus-
sions of sexual orientation suggest. Women of different classes, races, cultures, sex-
ual identities, ages, and generations are likely to differ on the points I discuss. And
not all communities share the dominant understanding of sexual orientation, i.e.,
that sexual orientation is determined by the relative physical sexes of two sexual
partners. Nor am I asserting that no woman has a sexual orientation.
155. For criticisms of sexual orientation categories on other bases, see, for exam-
ple, ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 623-25
(1948) [hereinafter KINSEY, HUMAN MALE]; ALFRED C. KINSEY, SEXUAL BEHAV-
IOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE 452-57 (1953) [hereinafter KINSEY, HUMAN FEMALE];
LAUMANN ET AL., supra note 98, at 287-90; Case, supra note 19, at 1; Gayle Rubin,
Thinking Sex, in PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 267, 308
(Carole S. Vance ed., 1984).
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tion are not included in the bisexual category in ordinary usage
because bisexuals have the characteristics of both homosexuals
and heterosexuals in terms of desiring partners with certain phys-
ical sexes. In most discussions, "bisexual" refers not to someone
who is indifferent to the physical sex of their lover(s) - someone
without a sexual orientation - but to someone who craves lovers
with male bodies and lovers with female bodies. 156 Women with
a fluid sexuality may not have "cravings" for people with particu-
lar kinds of genitals.
The assumption that a lover's physical sexual shape is of key
importance is troubling not only because it does not reflect the
reality of some women, but also because it camouflages sexual
possibilities. This is especially troubling for women given the
tendency of male heterosexuality to objectify women in harmful
ways. In our culture, a woman without a sexual orientation is
likely to assume that she is a heterosexual and to be confirmed in
that understanding through her initial heterosexual exper-
iences.157 If these experiences are sexually arousing, she must be
heterosexual. According to our understanding of sexual orienta-
tion, there is an enormous difference between making love to a
person with the same or different physical sex. The message our
culture delivers is that unless one is bisexual, one should be dis-
gusted by making love to people with one body shape and ex-
cited by making love to people with another.
There is empirical evidence that some people, particularly
women, may not have a sexual orientation in the sense of a pref-
erence for people whose bodies are male or female (or for both).
Surveys of lesbians and gay men reveal that women are four
times as likely as gay men to regard sexual orientation as a mat-
ter of choice. 158 Women who classify themselves as lesbians, and
not as bisexuals, are also more likely to report heterosexual at-
tractions, fantasies, or dreams than men who identify as gay.' 59
156. This is why bisexuals are perceived to be constitutionally incapable of mo-
nogamy. See, e.g., John Leland, Bisexuality Emerges as a New Sexual Identity,
NEWSWEEK, July 17, 1995, at 44, 47 ("In a culture organized, however precariously,
around monogamy, bisexuality lurks as a rupture in the social structure, conjuring
fears of promiscuity, secret lives and instability.").
157. See supra text accompanying note 149.
158. See Lever, supra note 122, at 23, 29 (reporting that 16% of women but only
4% of gay men in a 1994 survey regard their sexual orientation as chosen in some
sense).
159. See id. "Only one quarter of women who identified themselves as lesbians
and not bisexuals said they are exclusively homosexual in their sexual attractions,
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In addition, there is evidence that women's sexuality is mal-
leable. A study of women in "swinging" marriages 160 indicates
that although few of these women had fantasies about women or
felt sexually attracted to women prior to their "swinging" exper-
iences, most of these women reported having such fantasies and
attractions afterwards. 161
My point is not that the categories "lesbian" and "gay man"
make no sense. On the contrary, they may make sense for many
people as conventionally defined. Many people do feel desire for
sexual intimacy with people of a certain physical sex. Even peo-
ple without a sexual orientation can identify or live as lesbians,
gay men, or bisexuals. My point is simply that not everyone has
a desire for sexual intimacy either with men (because they have
men's bodies) or women (because they have women's bodies) or
both.
While many people without a sexual orientation may even
have a clear preference for intimacy with men or women (or
both), that preference is often based on factors other than an
object's physical sex. It might, for example, be based on a prefer-
ence for intimacy with people who have the gender male or the
gender female, i.e., people who have certain capacities for rela-
tionships we enjoy. For some women, a relationship with a wo-
man may be much easier to find as well as more fulfilling than a
relationship with a man.
When we ignore the fluidity of women's sexuality, we adopt
a heterosexist and androcentric view of reality. We agree that
sexual relationships between women and between a woman and
a man are so inherently different on a physical level that most
women who find one arousing will find the other disgusting.
Thus, the possibility of being without sexual orientation - the
possibility of sexual fluidity - is hidden from many women. The
ordinary view of sexual orientation conceals that a woman might
fantasies, and dreams; for comparison, close to two thirds of [gay] male respondents
in the 1994 survey claimed total exclusivity in sexual orientation." Id.
160. Marriages in which couples engage in unconventional forms of sex, such as
sex with another person or couple.
161. See Joan K. Dixon, Sexuality and Relationship Changes in Married Females
Following the Commencement of Bisexual Activity, 11 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 115, 122-
23 (1985). See also KINSEY, HUMAN FEMALE, supra note 155, at 472. Kinsey reports
that 14-19% of unmarried women in his sample did not have any overt allocentric
sexual experiences or fantasies. This suggests that many women may be asexual (or
so sexually repressed) as to lack a sexual orientation in some essence. My focus in
the text is on women who are sexually active and lack a sexual orientation.
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find a number of advantages in a relationship with another wo-
man. If in fact some women might prefer more equitable rela-
tionships with other women to relationships with men were they
aware of the possibility, then taboos on lesbian relationships fa-
cilitate men's immoral subordination and exploitation of women
in heterosexual relationships.
V. REALITY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE
MARRIAGE DEBATE
In this Part, I argue that bans on lesbian marriage discrimi-
nate formally and substantively on the basis of sex. Such bans
discriminate on the basis of sex on a formal level because they
treat women and men differently; only men can marry women.
Such bans discriminate on a substantive level because they pres-
sure women to enter into intimate relationships in which they are
subordinated and exploited. I begin by describing the formal ar-
gument because courts generally have used a formal standard for
sex equality and because this argument is the only one that has
succeeded in winning same-sex marriage rights. I then go on to
make a substantive equality argument, using the analysis sug-
gested by discussions in earlier sections of this Article.
In Baehr v. Lewin, 162 the Supreme Court of Hawaii used
formal equality to hold that Hawaii's law discriminated on the
basis of sex in violation of the state's equal rights amendment
unless on remand 163 Hawaii could prove that its ban was nar-
rowly drawn to serve compelling governmental purposes. 164
Under the formal equality standard, rules requiring women to
162. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
163. The trial court found that the state of Hawaii failed to sustain its burden.
See Baehr v. Miike, No. CIV. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *16 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3,
1996).
164. Under the Hawaiian Constitution, strict scrutiny is applied to classifications
based on sex, whereas only intermediate level scrutiny has generally been applied to
sex cases under the United States Constitution. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976). Justice Ginsburg seems to want to move the court closer to strict scrutiny
cases. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S.Ct. 2264 (1996). I believe that even under
intermediate scrutiny, bans on same-sex marriages should fall. I therefore use the
intermediate standard in my analysis. See infra notes 165-79 and accompanying text.
No federal court has, as yet, ruled on the constitutionality of state bans on
same-sex marriage. Prior to Baehr v. Lewin, a number of state courts rejected vari-
ous challenges to such bans. See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn.
1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (arguing denial of marriage to same sex
couple violates (1) their statutory right since the state marriage statute does not
require a man and a woman for a "marriage"; (2) their fundamental rights under the
Due Process and Equal Protection clauses.
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marry men and vice versa discriminate on the basis of sex; indi-
vidual women and men are treated differently. Women can only
marry men and men can only marry women.
As some commentators and Supreme Court members have
noted, maintaining the difference between women and men is a
key part of the system of sex discrimination in the United States
today. 165 The limitations and rigidity imposed on individuals by
gender roles ground the Supreme Court's commitment to formal
equality;166 the government discriminates on the basis of sex
when similarly situated individuals are treated differently by the
government because of their physical sex. Such discrimination
reinforces traditional roles and stereotypes, and the law demands
that it must cease unless the government can show that the classi-
fication serves "important governmental objectives" and "must
be substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives."'1 67
It might be objected that bans on same-sex marriage treat
women and men similarly because neither can marry someone of
the same sex.168 This is not, however, the meaning of sex dis-
crimination under the Equal Protection Clause. A state could
not, for example, defend a requirement that females attend one
set of schools and males attend another by arguing that there was
no sex discrimination because members of both sexes were re-
quired to attend same-sex public schools. Same-sex schools
clearly discriminate on the basis of sex.169 The only question
would be whether such sex discrimination could be justified by
evidence of its relation to a strong and valid government
objective.
165. See supra note 19.
166. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,76 (1971) (preferring male family mem-
bers over female family members for executor of an estate is "the very kind of arbi-
trary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment").
167. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197. This standard may have been changed by United
States v. Virginia, 116 S.Ct. 2264 (1996). See supra note 164.
168. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1967). This argument was rejected
by the Court in this decision.
169. For cases in which the Supreme Court found same-sex schools to be sex
discrimination and not supported by compelling governmental interests, see Vir-
ginia, 116 S.Ct. at 2276 (Virginia failed to show compelling governmental interest in
keeping military school all male); see also Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718 (1982) (Mississippi failed to show compelling governmental interest in
keeping nursing school all female).
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Bans on lesbian marriage discriminate against women on a
substantive as well as a formal level by pressuring women to
enter intimate relationships in which they are subordinated and
exploited. Subordination begins at home where women and men
still play quite different roles, roles that tend to give men more
sexual pleasure, less unwanted sex, more leisure time, and
greater financial security than enjoyed by their wives. Requiring
women to marry men facilitates the ability of men to exploit wo-
men's sexuality as well as their emotional, domestic, and repro-
ductive labor without adequate compensation.
Perhaps the ban on lesbian marriage can be justified as serv-
ing an important government purpose despite the fact that it dis-
criminates on the basis of sex. The most likely justifications here
are the consequentialist arguments against lesbian relationships
discussed in Part II: (1) lesbian relationships cause higher levels
of promiscuity and sexually transmitted disease than do hetero-
sexual relationships; (2) lesbian relationships lead to sexual abuse
of children by adults; (3) acceptance of lesbian relationships will
result in fewer good homes and confusing role models for chil-
dren; (4) acceptance of lesbian relationships threatens the stabil-
ity of marriage; and (5) heterosexuality is necessary in order to
civilize men.
The first three, as discussed earlier, are inconsistent with all
but one piece of available evidence. That evidence is the possi-
bility that lesbian parents may be more likely than heterosexuals
to raise children who later identify as gay or lesbian.170 This jus-
tification is, however, circular. Unless being in a lesbian or gay
relationship is a problem, it is irrelevant that lesbians might be
more likely to raise children who become lesbian or gay. In fact,
from the perspective of girls and women, it is an advantage to
grow up seeing lesbian existence as a possibility in light of the
widespread immorality in heterosexual relationships. It would,
therefore, be difficult to conclude that the ban on lesbian mar-
riages is significantly related to a compelling governmental pur-
pose for any of these reasons.
Indeed, at the trial in Baehr v. Miike,171 the Attorney Gen-
eral of Hawaii attempted to justify the ban on same-sex marriage
by arguing that children are best off with two biological parents.
All but one of the four experts for the state testified, however,
170. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
171. No. CIV. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235.
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that people other than biological fathers and mothers can be
wonderful parents. 172 Two of these experts specifically testified
that lesbians and gay men could be wonderful parents.173 The
trial judge himself was a stepfather. He found the state's argu-
ment for banning same-sex marriage - to protect children from
living with one or more parents to whom they are not biologi-
cally related - less than compelling. 174
The remaining two justifications for banning lesbian mar-
riage are family stability and the civilization of men. However, it
is difficult to imagine how a court could consider either of these
justifications a legitimate reason for sex discrimination. Tradi-
tional forms of sex discrimination, particularly limitations on wo-
men's employment opportunities, would more directly contribute
to the stability of heterosexual marriages in the short term than
the ban on lesbian marriages. 175 Yet, as discussed earlier, 176 the
Supreme Court has prohibited such discrimination.
Although the ban on lesbian marriage is an easy case of sex
discrimination under the Supreme Court's formal standard as
well as on a more substantive level, it is unlikely that the Court
will recognize the ban as sex discrimination in the near future.
Today's Court is careful not to go too far in front of the majority
of the public on controversial issues, particularly controversial
moral issues.177 The Supreme Court did protect lesbians and gay
men in Romer v. Evans178 by striking the Colorado constitutional
amendment prohibiting any governmental protection of lesbians
172. See id. at *8-21.
173. See id. at *8-17. One expert testified that although nonbiological parents
could be good parents, he knew little about lesbian and gay parenting (though he
had once been an expert in a case involving a lesbian mother's custody and, in that
case, had regarded the mother's sexual orientation as irrelevant). See id. at *18-21.
The other expert for the state did not believe in either social science or evolution so
was given little credibility by the judge. See id. at *17-18.
174. See id. at *18.
175. For example, the ban on women's bar admission upheld in Bradwell v. Illi-
nois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872). That decision is, however, viewed as overruled by the mod-
ern Supreme Court cases striking sex-based classifications. See, e.g., Kirchberg v.
Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) (striking down community property law giving hus-
band unilateral control of jointly owned marital property).
176. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
177. About 60% of Americans remain opposed to, recognition of same-sex mar-
riage though most support bans on discrimination in employment on the basis of
sexual orientation. See Ball, supra note 78, at 1877 n.22 (reporting that 62% of
those polled by Newsweek opposed legal recognition of same-sex marriage though
81% favored protection of lesbians and gay men from housing discrimination and
74% from employment discrimination).
178. 116 S.Ct. 1620, 1628 (1996).
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and gay men from discrimination. But the scope of that decision
is fairly narrow. Gay men and lesbians were not recognized as a
protected class themselves, a result that would have been easy to
reach doctrinally and would have afforded broad protection. Nor
was discrimination against lesbians and gay men recognized as
sex discrimination, though that result seems doctrinally man-
dated by the Court's formal approach to sex equality and also
would have afforded broad protection. 179 Instead, the Court de-
cided the case on very narrow grounds, holding only that an iden-
tifiable group could not be burdened in a unique way in political
processes.
With regard to same-sex marriage, the Court's temerity will
be inconsistent with both its substantive standard of formal
equality for sex discrimination and with the reason it has repeat-
edly given for requiring that women and men to be treated simi-
larly by the state - to allow individuals to choose their own
paths and roles rather than being constrained by traditional ste-
reotypes.180 The Court's determination to eliminate rigid sex
roles will end when confronting a controversial change that has
real potential to break down sex-role stereotypes - allowing wo-
men to marry women.
The Court may use traditional morality to justify its denial of
marriage rights to lesbian couples. I have suggested that the
Court should not accept this justification because this traditional
moral norm facilitates the subordination of women to men in in-
timate relationships. But, as noted at the beginning of this Arti-
cle, the Court has never developed a jurisprudence explaining
when moral norms can legitimate otherwise unconstitutional
state action. The Court may simply say, as it has in other
cases,' 8 ' that in the case of bans on same-sex marriage, tradi-
tional morality trumps sex discrimination.
179. See sources cited supra note 19.
180. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 116 S.Ct 2264 (1996). In her opinion for
the Court, Justice Ginsburg rejects the establishment of a separate leadership insti-
tution for women based on traditional notions of "'the way women are,"' id. at
2268, noting that "generalizations" about women can "no longer justify denying op-
portunity to women whose talent and capacity place them outside the average de-
scription." Id.
181. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In the nineteenth century, norms based on the "moral" in-
feriority of African-Americans and women, including their sup-
posedly weaker sexual morality, enabled whites and men to use
African-Americans and women in immoral and subordinating
ways. In this Article, I have argued that current "moral" norms
concerning the inferiority of homosexuality to heterosexuality
function in similar ways.
None of the traditional moral arguments against lesbian re-
lationships can justify the overt sex discrimination in bans on les-
bian marriages. Autonomy-denying objectification is a better
gauge of sexual immorality than whether the couple is heterosex-
ual or homosexual. Autonomy-denying sex is most common
among heterosexual men and typically consists of their immoral
sexual exploitation of women in heterosexual relationships. In
light of these moral problems with heterosexuality, taboos on les-
bian relationships are at the core of sex discrimination. Current
understandings of sexual orientation obscure from some women
the possibility that they might prefer intimate relationships with
other women, not because of the shape of women's bodies, but
because women are more emotionally supportive, less sexually
exploitive, and more committed to domestic equality.
Acceptance of lesbian relationships is important to the well
being of women who would still prefer heterosexual relationships
as well as to those who would prefer lesbian relationships.
Greater acceptance of lesbian relationships will mean that wo-
men can choose between heterosexual and same-sex relation-
ships. Until there is acceptance of lesbian relationships, men will
remain uncommitted to moral heterosexual relationships. As
Adrienne Rich has noted, compulsory heterosexuality ensures
that men can interact with women on men's terms.
To a large extent, the current debate within the lesbian-gay
community on the advisability of pushing for marriage rights at
this time ignores the way in which marriage rights for lesbians are
linked to compulsory heterosexuality. This debate misses how
compulsory heterosexuality facilitates men's ability to dominate
women in intimate relationships and to exploit women's sexuality
as well as their domestic, emotional, and reproductive labor.
The Supreme Court should recognize state bans on lesbian
marriages as sex discrimination and a violation of the Equal Pro-
tection provision in the Fourteenth Amendment. Not only do
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such bans discriminate between men and women on a formal
level, but they also discriminate substantively by facilitating the
ability of men to exploit women's sexuality as well as their emo-
tional, domestic, and reproductive labor. That such taboos are
supported by traditional moral norms should not justify them.
Traditional moral norms have often served immoral purposes
and should be rejected when, as here, they facilitate immorality.
